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ABSTRACT
This dissertation investigates the role of foreign direct investment and agglomeration
economies in the process of industrial development, with a focus on the productivity of
manufacturing firms. The first chapter analyzes the importance of the source of foreign
direct investment on the performance of domestic Chinese firms. The second chapter
studies the interaction between foreign and domestic manufacturing firms operating in the
same industry and located within the same Chinese city. The third chapter examines the
response of multinational companies to changes in domestic institutions. My findings
highlight the importance of the source of foreign direct investment, proximity to economic
activity, and strong institutional incentives in enhancing firm performance in developing
economies.
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______________________________________________________________________________

1. Foreign Direct Investment, Agglomeration, and
Productivity
______________________________________________________
My dissertation studies the role of foreign direct investment (FDI) and
agglomeration economies in the industrial development process in the context of a
developing economy, China. Recognizing technology as a driver of economic growth,
governments in developing countries spend significant resources to attract FDI in the hopes
of realizing positive spillovers in the form of international technology transfer as well as
opportunities to imitate new products, hire foreign-trained labor, and become suppliers to
and consumers of intermediate inputs produced by foreign companies, all of which are
believed to enhance domestic firm performance. However, entry of foreign firms can also
increase competition in output and input markets spurring domestic firm efficiency or
forcing them out of the market. In each of my three chapters, outlined in greater detail in
subsequent paragraphs, I argue that the source of foreign investment as well as the domestic
economic landscape in which these investments are made shapes the gains that result from
FDI. My empirical research leads to three main findings. First, foreign acquirers from more
developed countries significantly increase domestic firm performance. Second, positive
spillovers from FDI within a city-industry space tend to decline with increases in
technological distance between firms. Finally, liberalized ownership rules produce changes in
the control structures of foreign enterprises as they respond to domestic institutional
distortions.
The first chapter examines the importance of the source of foreign direct investment
on domestic firm performance in a developing country context. Using a newly created panel
1

of domestic Chinese firms who are acquired by foreign investors, I find evidence of higher
productivity gains by firms acquired by investors from OECD countries relative to those
acquired by investors from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT). To control for possible
endogeneity of the acquisition decision, I employ propensity score matching combined with
a difference-in-differences approach. The results indicate that relative to HMT-acquired
firms, OECD-acquired firms experience higher total factor productivity (TFP) in the initial
year of acquisition and this productivity differential persists in subsequent years, reaching
24.5% in the third year. Further results point to the introduction of management techniques
that reduce labor inefficiencies along with capital deepening as likely sources of the TFP
increase. The TFP differential is stronger in industries with higher domestic content.
Together, these results suggest that the development level of the investor source country
affects the opportunities for technology transfer.
The second chapter examines how the presence of nearby foreign multinational
companies (MNCs) alters the economic landscape in which domestic enterprises operate.
MNCs are believed to generate positive own-industry (localization) spillovers. However,
MNCs also tend to exert negative competitive pressures in output and input markets. Using
panel data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China during 1998-2006, this paper
provides empirical evidence on the net effect of these opposing forces that arise in the
presence of MNCs. Central to the analysis is the opportunity to rank nearby activity, in
ascending order of productivity, into state, private, and foreign ownership types. Results
indicate that spillovers are largest within the same ownership types, consistent with the
presence of traditional localization economies. However, across ownership types spillovers
differ in two ways. They tend to be much weaker compared to within ownership type
2

spillovers. In addition, spillovers from more productive foreign to less productive domestic
enterprises are smaller compared to spillovers in the reverse direction. I also find evidence of
positive spillovers from private-owned enterprises to all three ownership types, suggestive of
the important role of indigenous private enterprises in the Chinese economy. Finally, I find
evidence for ethnic networks facilitating localization spillovers.
The third chapter, coauthored with Mary E. Lovely, utilizes a quasi-experiment in
China‟s WTO accession to observe multinationals‟ response to changes in property rights in
a developing country. WTO accession reduced incentives for joint ventures while reducing
constraints on wholly owned foreign subsidiaries. Concomitant with these changes was a
more liberal investment environment for indigenous investors. An adaptation of Feenstra
and Hanson‟s (2005) property rights model suggests that higher productivity and value
added of a joint venture, but lower domestic sales share, increases the likelihood that the
venture will become wholly foreign owned following liberalization. Theory also suggests
that an enterprise with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales will be
more likely to switch from a joint venture to wholly domestic owned. Using newly created
enterprise-level panel data on equity joint ventures and changes in registration type following
China‟s WTO accession, we find evidence consistent with the property rights theory. More
productive firms with higher value added and lower domestic sales shares are more likely to
become wholly foreign owned, while less productive firms focused on the Chinese market
are more likely to become wholly domestic owned rather than remain joint ventures. In
addition to highlighting the importance of incomplete contracts and property rights in the
international organization of production, these results support the view that external

3

commitment to liberalization through WTO accession influences multinational and
indigenous firms‟ behavior.
To conclude, the three chapters of my dissertation investigate the roles of foreign
direct investment and agglomeration economies in enhancing domestic manufacturing firm
productivity. I find robust evidence that domestic institutions impact the types of foreign
investment entering a country and that this investment affects local firm productivity and
organizational form. Greater foreign investment can mean greater access to technology and
higher domestic firm productivity, providing opportunity for higher incomes and better
living standards. However, to maximize the benefits from foreign direct investment, my
thesis underscores the need to understand the source of foreign direct investment and the
domestic landscape where foreign and domestic firms interact.

4

_______________________________________________________________________

2. Origin of FDI and Firm Performance: Evidence from
Foreign Acquisitions of Chinese Domestic Firms
______________________________________________________
2.1

Introduction
Recognizing technology as a driver of economic growth, governments in developing

countries spend significant resources to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in the hope
of international technology transfer.1,2 Given the geographic concentration of innovation
activity, however, not all FDI provides the same opportunity for transfer of advanced
technology to the host country. In 2000, 82% of global research and development (R&D)
expenditures were undertaken in Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) countries and half were performed by the United States and Japan alone (Lovely
and Popp, forthcoming). A consequence of this concentration is that multinational firms
from OECD countries are believed to have superior technological capabilities.3 That this
superior technology will be transferred to less advanced settings is not guaranteed, however,
as host-country firms may not have the capacity to absorb superior know-how into their
production processes.4 Thus, while there is reason to believe that the development level of

1

“International technology transfer refers to any process by which a party in one country gains access to
technical information of a foreign party and successfully absorbs it into its production process.” (Glass and
Saggi, 2008)
2

See Keller (2004, 2010) for surveys of the literature on international technology diffusion.

3

Global R&D activity is primarily carried out by multinationals (Pack and Saggi, 1997).

4

The usage of the term absorptive capacity follows Cohen and Levinthal (1990).

5

the investor source country alters the opportunities for technology transfer, the extent of
such transfer is an open empirical question.
This paper searches for evidence of technology transfer via FDI, in particular
through foreign merger and acquisition activity in China, explicitly distinguishing between
investors from OECD countries and those from the less innovative but nearby economies
of Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT).5 The analysis is carried out by comparing the
post-acquisition productivity performance of OECD and HMT acquired firms.6 An obvious
challenge in comparisons is the possibility that OECD investors systematically choose high
productivity Chinese firms as acquisition targets. Without appropriate recognition of
possible selection bias, observed post-acquisition performance may reflect superior domestic
capability rather than superior foreign firm technology transfer. I account for possible
endogeneity of the acquisition decision through the use of propensity score matching, by
which a HMT-acquired firm is assigned to every OECD-acquired firm as a proxy for the
missing counterfactual of an OECD-acquired firm had it instead been acquired by a HMT
investor. I then further employ a difference-in-differences approach to control for
unobservable but time invariant differences between the two groups of acquired firms.
This paper offers two contributions to the literature that examines the causal link
between FDI and productivity. First, this study distinguishes between the sources of FDI
instead of treating all FDI alike and documents differences in post-acquisition productivity
performance. Existing literature primarily focuses on the foreign ownership effects without

The terms mergers and acquisitions are used interchangeably in this paper. See DePamphilis (2010) for a
detailed overview.
5

Foreign acquisition is defined as the event when the firm‟s foreign equity share exceeds or equals 25%. See
section 2.4 for a discussion of the data.
6

6

distinguishing FDI by source. Although not the focal point of these studies, some exceptions
include Conyon et al (2002), Harris and Robinson (2003), and Schiffbauer, Siedschlag, and
Ruane (2009) who find that domestic firms in the U.K. who are acquired by U.S. investors
experience the largest increase in productivity compared to those acquired by investors from
the EU or other countries. More recently, a study by Chen (2009) finds that foreign
acquisitions of U.S. domestic firms lead to increases in sales if the acquirers are from
industrialized rather than developing countries.
The second contribution of the present study is its developing country context,
unlike Chen (2009). Without distinguishing by source countries, previous studies investigate
post-acquisition productivity performance of domestic firms in developing countries and
generally find that foreign ownership increases post-acquisition productivity (Arnold and
Javorcik (2009) focusing on Indonesia; Petkova (2008) on India; and Djankov and Hoekman
(2000) on the Czech Republic). However, as noted above, technology transfer may be
attenuated by the distance between source and host country development level. The present
study fills this gap by estimating the post-acquisition productivity gain realized by a
developing country receiving investment from relatively more advanced economies.
China provides a suitable setting to explore these issues. Since 1993, China has been
the largest recipient of FDI inflows in the developing world.7 Foreign direct investment in
China can be broadly classified as originating from the ethnically Chinese economies of
Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (HMT) and all other economies but primarily OECD
countries. Table 2.1 provides the source country share of actually utilized FDI in total nonHMT FDI between 1998 and 2006. On average, OECD countries accounted for 60% of all
See Fung, Iizaka, and Tong (2004) for an overview of the development of China‟s FDI policy and subsequent
changes in FDI inflows.
7

7

non-HMT FDI, with the United States and Japan the source of more than half of these
inflows.8 Hu and Jefferson (2002) find that the high share of FDI coming from advanced
countries is important for technology transfer in China because OECD investment carries
“higher technology content.” Furthermore, Zhang (2005) argues that compared to OECD
investors who operate on frontiers of world technology, HMT investors derive their
advantages from marketing and on-time delivery skills.
These source country differences suggest that technology transfer should be more
pronounced in domestic Chinese firms acquired by OECD firms relative to their HMTacquired counterparts. I investigate this hypothesis by calculating and comparing the postacquisition change in total factor productivity (TFP) experienced by OECD-acquired firms
to that experienced by HMT-acquired firms. I interpret a positive post-acquisition
productivity differential as evidence of differences in technology transfer by investor group.
I build a panel of Chinese domestic manufacturing firms who are acquired by OECD or
HMT investors between 1999 and 2004, using annual firm-level data collected by China‟s
National Bureau of Statistics. Difference-in-differences analysis indicates that OECDacquired firms experience higher productivity post-acquisition relative to HMT-acquired
firms, net of the initial difference in the pre-acquisition period. In particular, the TFP
differential is 12.3% in the year of acquisition, 11.1% one year after and reaches 24.5% in the
third year. This result is strongest in industries with high domestic content in exports. This
latter finding suggests that in developing countries with high shares of processing exports,
such as China, Vietnam, and Mexico, transfer of advanced technology via foreign direct
investment might not materialize if the local economy specializes in a narrow range of tasks.

8

Henceforth, non-HMT will be referred to as OECD.

8

I further find that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired firms experience
higher average wage and capital intensity in all post-acquisition periods. Moreover, because
employment does not increase, average wage increase appears to result from application of
techniques that improve labor productivity and thereby reduce inefficiencies. There is no
support for “learning by exporting” effects as I find no post-acquisition increases in the
share of output that is exported.9 Likewise, there is no evidence of increases in innovation
measured as the value of new products in total sales. Taken together, these results suggest
that introduction of management techniques along with capital deepening are the likely
sources of TFP increases in OECD-acquired firms.
To explore possible concerns about the propensity score matching technique, I re-do
the analysis using data on acquired firms in the textile industry only.10 Results from this
analysis conform to the patterns observed earlier – OECD-acquired firms experience higher
productivity in post-acquisition periods with the largest impact in the year of acquisition.
The similar pattern of results lends confidence that the TFP differential is not being driven
by specifics of the matching technique used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 provides a conceptual
framework that predicts differences in the post-acquisition performance of firms facing
relatively high fixed acquisition costs. I then apply this framework to OECD and HMT
acquisitions and derive the empirical acquisition model. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical
strategy. Section 2.4 describes the data and measurement of total factor productivity.

“Learning by exporting” is the idea that firms improve their relative productivity after they begin exporting.
For example, see De Loecker (2007) for a recent empirical study.
9

For the baseline results, matches for each OECD-acquired firm are not constrained to be within the same
industry in order to increase the likelihood of successful matches.
10

9

Section 2.5 presents the empirical findings for all industries and Section 2.6 for the textile
industry alone. The final section discusses the relevance of these results to our understanding
of technology transfer.

2.2

Conceptual Framework
To inform the empirical strategy used in this paper, a simple framework for analyzing

the acquisition decision of OECD and HMT investors is adapted from Hall (1988). There
are two types of multinational firms, , (acquirers) – those from OECD countries and those
from Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan. The acquirers may differ with respect to firm
capabilities,

and

. Capability encompasses both productivity as well as perception

of quality about a firm‟s products and underlying these „revealed‟ capabilities is the knowhow or technology of the firm (Sutton, 2005). There is a domestic target, , among a pool of
domestic Chinese firms, , with a fixed capability,

, located in China. The multinational

firms bid for the target. The value of acquiring a domestic Chinese target to a representative
foreign multinational can be expressed as,

(

where

(

)

(2.2.1)

) is the discounted value of the flow of profits from the acquired firm which

depends on the capabilities of the target as well as the capabilities of the acquirer.
fixed cost of acquisition and

is a

represents a random shock. I assume that OECD and

HMT investors differ with respect to fixed costs of acquisition because HMT firms are
physically and culturally closer to mainland China than are OECD firms. Distance impacts
10

the costs of acquiring information prior to acquisition for due diligence. If an acquirer is
physically closer, it may be able to discern and act on information more expediently. HMT
investors also have an advantage in terms of sharing the same language and culture as
mainland China, and they may have business and family ties that facilitate transactions with
local firms and authorities. HMT investors also had a first-mover advantage in that they
entered China well before other investors (Huang, Jin, Qian, 2010) which could have allowed
them to establish stronger local networks. Formally, I assume that fixed costs of acquisition
.11 A

for OECD investors are higher than for their HMT counterparts,

domestic target will only be acquired if the value of the firm to the foreign acquirer exceeds
.12 The probability that target is

the value of the target as a wholly owned domestic firm,

acquired by an OECD investor rather than a HMT investor can be expressed as,13

(

).

(2.2.2)

Therefore, the expression for the probability in (2.2.2) becomes,
[

(

(

)
(

(

(

))
)

(

)

].

( ))

(2.2.3)
See Huang, Lin, Qian (2010) for a discussion of how cultural proximity enjoyed by HMT investors may
influence the fixed costs of setting up FDI.
11

( )
, where ( ) represents the discounted value of the flow of profits from the wholly
domestic owned firm which depends on the capability of the target and is a random shock.
12

The acquisition price in Hall (1988) is “an endogenously determined division of the rents which accrue to a
merger” (p. 17). Guided by my matching strategy, I do not model the mechanism of how the actual acquisition
price is determined in equilibrium. Equation (2.2.2) simply requires this price to exceed the value of the firm as
a wholly domestic firm.
13

11

Assuming that the

‟s are independently and identically distributed across alternatives

following a Type I extreme value distribution (McFadden, 1974), we obtain the multinomial
logit probability that an acquisition will take place as,

(

)

(
∑

(
(

)
(

)
)

)

.

(2.2.4)

If we observe a domestic firm that has an equal probability of being acquired by
either an OECD or a HMT multinational, we can use (2.2.4) to compare the expected profits
under the two possible outcomes. Because

, it must be the case that the

OECD investor expects a larger flow of profits from acquisition than does the HMT
investor. Higher profits are consistent with OECD multinationals having higher fixed
capabilities,

, and should be observed as higher post-acquisition TFP and

profits.
Intuitively, we can think about the implications of (2.2.2) within models with firm
heterogeneity of acquirers such as Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz, and Yeaple (2004)
without making a formal argument. In heterogeneous firm models only higher productivity
firms are able to cover higher fixed entry costs. Assuming OECD and HMT investors are
similar in all respects except that OECD investors have a higher fixed cost of acquisition
relative to HMT investors, then the TFP distribution of OECD buyers who acquire targets
in China is shifted right compared to that of HMT buyers. Thus, higher fixed acquisition
costs are consistent with the assumption that the firms from OECD countries investing in
China have, on average, higher fixed capabilities than those from HMT. We can then expect
that for a given target post-acquisition productivity will be higher if acquired by an OECD
12

firm than by a HMT firm due to the higher capabilities of OECD investors who enter
China.

2.3

Empirical Strategy
The goal of this paper is to evaluate the importance of the source of FDI on post-

acquisition performance of domestic firms in a developing country context. To that end, I
compare the change in total factor productivity of a domestic Chinese firm acquired by an
OECD investor (treatment group) to that of a domestic Chinese firm acquired by a HMT
investor (control group). In an ideal setting, I would observe outcomes for an OECD target
had it been acquired by a HMT investor. However, domestic Chinese firms can be in only
one of three states of the world – (i) it is acquired by an OECD investor, (ii) it is acquired by
a HMT investor, or (iii) it remains a domestic firm. In particular,
*

+ where

denotes a state of the world or a particular

treatment in the language of the microeconometric evaluation literature. Thus, we never
observe the desired counterfactual, leading to a missing data problem.
Matching is used to construct the missing counterfactual or control group by
selecting a group of firms from the pool of HMT-acquired firms that share similar
observable characteristics as the OECD-acquired or treated firms in the pre-acquisition
period. I employ propensity score matching to construct these counterfactuals, as discussed
in detail below.14 Matching attenuates potential endogeneity of the acquisition decision, as
would occur if OECD investors select higher productivity targets.

14

See Blundell and Costa Dias (2002) for a review of alternative methods used for program evaluation.

13

A preview of the unconditional data in Figure 2.1 shows that the distributions of
TFP of both OECD and HMT targets in the pre-acquisition period are visually almost
identical. However, the two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test rejects the null hypothesis that
the distribution of TFP of OECD versus HMT targets come from the same distribution at
the 1% level.15 This implies that the two distributions differ in a statistical sense and this
difference could be a result of some sorting based on target TFP. This necessitates the use of
propensity score matching to compare the performance of OECD-acquired firms with a
carefully selected group of HMT-acquired firms sharing similar pre-acquisition
characteristics. Prior to matching, I expect the mean difference between the two groups to
be statistically significant while no statistical difference should remain after matching in the
pre-acquisition period. The balancing tests, discussed in detail in Section 2.5.1, show that
matching minimizes the pre-acquisition differences between OECD and HMT-acquired
firms.

2.3.1

Propensity Score Matching
In this study a domestic Chinese firm can be acquired by either an OECD or HMT

investor. The analysis focuses on the pair wise average treatment effects. Imbens (1999) and
Lechner (2001) show that the Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) propensity score for the binary
treatment case extends to the multiple treatment case as well. The focus of this study is only
on one particular set of pair wise average treatment effect – post-acquisition productivity
between OECD and HMT acquired firms. Therefore,

and will represent OECD and

HMT, respectively. Adopting notation from Lechner (2002a, 2002b), the pair wise average
15

The two-sided Smirnov-Kolmogorov test statistic is 0.0744(0.0000) with p-value in parentheses.
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treatment effects,

, of treatments

and for the target firm in treatment

can be

estimated as,

(

where

(

)

(

)

(2.3.1.1)

is the expected effect for a target firm randomly drawn from the population of

participants in treatment
(

)

. The first expression after the second equality in (2.3.1),

) which is the outcome for a Chinese domestic target that is acquired by

an OECD investor, is readily observed for targets that have been acquired by OECD
investors. However, the counterfactual (

) which is the outcome for the

same domestic target had it been acquired by a HMT investor, cannot be observed leading to
an omitted variable problem.
It is not possible to design an experiment where assignment of treatment is random,
in this study an OECD acquisition, which would guarantee that the post-acquisition
outcomes are independent of the assignment mechanism such that
(

(

)

). In non-experimental studies such as this, the acquisition decision is not

random and therefore

(

) cannot be measured using (

score matching is used to construct (

). Propensity

) by selecting a match for every OECD-

acquired firm from the group of HMT-acquired firms, based on a set of similar observable
characteristics, . Matching eliminates differences between OECD and HMT acquired firms
based on the observable characteristics included in . However, the vector of covariates, ,
may be very large leading to the “curse of dimensionality” that arises when trying to match
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on multiple observable characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and can be overcome
using the propensity score that is a scalar variable.
In order to estimate the marginal probabilities, the value of acquisition to a
representative foreign multinational is modeled as a function of the target‟s pre-acquisition
characteristics, including productivity, sales, age, capital-labor ratio, average wage, and state
equity share. The estimation also includes year, region, and industry fixed effects. The
estimation results are discussed in detail under Section 2.5.

2.3.2

Propensity Score Matching Difference-in-Differences
In addition to observable differences, there might be other systematic, unobservable

differences between the two groups of acquired firms that are time invariant. The differencein-differences matching (DDM) estimator addresses this issue by eliminating unobservable,
time-invariant differences between the two acquired groups of firms. The estimator,

,

compares the change in the average TFP between a time period preceding the acquisition
and a time period after the acquisition. Specifically,

.(

)

(

where denotes the year of acquisition and
acquisition and

(
)

)|
(

/
|

)

(2.3.2.1)

denotes the number of years after the

is the year preceding the acquisition.

Formally, two conditions must be satisfied to achieve identification. The first is the
conditional independence assumption (CIA) which requires that treatment participation is
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orthogonal to treatment outcome conditional on observable characteristics, . This
condition is sometimes called a “data hungry” identification strategy because it requires the
researcher to observe all characteristics that jointly influence the potential outcomes as well
as the selection into the treatments. The dataset used in this paper contains detailed balance
sheet, income sheet and other demographic information about the targets in the pre and
post-acquisition periods which acquirers use to make their acquisition decisions. The detailed
nature of the dataset makes it easier to justify that CIA is not being violated (Lechner,
2002a). When propensity score matching is combined with difference-in-differences, CIA is
extended to condition on both observables and time-invariant unobservables and is known
as the bias stability assumption (Heckman, Ichimura, Todd, 1997). In the context of this
study, the bias stability assumption implies that time varying unobservables play no role in
which Chinese domestic target gets acquired by either an OECD or HMT investor.
The second condition is the common support or overlap condition. This requires
that all economic agents with the same values of

have a positive probability of being in

both the treated or control groups. The overlap condition substitutes for the absence of
experimental control units. In a randomized experiment where the treatment and control
samples are randomly drawn from the same population, the treatment effect for the treated
and untreated groups are identical. In the context of this study, the common support
requirement ensures that although matches for OECD-acquired firms, from the pool of
HMT-acquired firms, might not necessarily be drawn from the same population, we will
observe the same set of pre-treatment characteristics for these two groups so that
comparisons are only made with similar firms.
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Adopting Lechner‟s (2001) notation the propensity score matching difference-indifferences estimator can be written as,

(

)

( )[

(

|

( )

)

]
(2.3.2.2)

( )

( )

where
and

( )

. Replacing

( )

is the propensity score in the multiple treatment framework

and with OECD and HMT,

( ) and

( ) are the

individual marginal probabilities of being acquired by a HMT and OECD investor
respectively, conditional on .16 These individual marginal probabilities
[̂

( ) ̂

( )] can be estimated in the multiple treatment case using multinomial
( )

logit or probit functions to estimate the conditional probability,
( )
( )

. Alternatively, Lechner (2002a) shows that the average treatment effect on

( )

the treated

, is also identified by conditioning jointly on the individual marginal

probabilities instead of conditioning on the conditional probability alone. Lechner (2002a,
2002b) also argues that it may be attractive to condition jointly on the marginal probabilities
( ) is the expectation of

instead of on the conditional probability since

( )
( )

( )

conditional on the marginal probabilities.
I follow the matching protocol described in Lechner (2002) to construct the missing
). First, ̂

counterfactual, (

( ) and ̂

( ) are estimated

from a multinomial logit model. Second, the common support condition is implemented
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using the minima and maxima comparison. Under this criterion, all observations whose
propensity score is smaller than the minimum and larger than the maximum in the opposite
group are deleted. Only one firm was deleted from the sample of OECD-acquired firms
after implementing the common support condition. The common support condition ensures
that any combination of characteristics observed in the group of OECD-acquired firms can
also be observed among the group of HMT-acquired firms. Finally, a HMT-acquired firm
that is closest in terms of the multivariate score, [ ̂

( ) ̂

( )], to an OECD-

acquired firm is chosen as the missing counterfactual.17 Closeness is measured using the
Mahalanobis distance metric.18 Once each OECD-acquired firm has been assigned a
counterfactual firm, difference-in-differences is performed as shown in (2.3.2.2). I expect
, when the outcome is productivity, since capabilities of OECD acquirers are
posited to be higher relative to those of HMT acquirers.

2.4

Data
The sample used in this study has been constructed from the Annual Surveys of

Industrial Production (ASIP) conducted by China‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
during 1998-2006. The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production includes all non-state
owned firms whose annual sales exceed 5 million yuan19 (referred to as “above-scale” by

A HMT-acquired firm may be chosen multiple times for different OECD-acquired firms. This could lead to
an inflation of variance if few observations are used repeatedly. This is not a problem in this study due to a
sufficiently large pool of HMT-acquired firms.
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√. ̂

( )

̂

( )/

.̂

( )

̂

( )/, where

is the sample covariance matrix of the

HMT-acquired group. See Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) for further details.
19

This amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.
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NBS) and all state-owned enterprises.20 The dataset contains detailed information on the
firm and its operations, including geographic administrative code, ownership type, gross
industrial output value, value added, export value, total employment, capital stock, and
intermediate inputs. The dataset also provides information about the equity shares in a firm
distinguishing between domestic and foreign sources. The foreign sources of equity are
further subdivided into those from OECD and HMT investors. Unfortunately, information
about individual source countries within these two broad categories is not available, so I
restrict the analysis to a comparison between these two groups.
The sample of firms used in the matching analysis is constructed as follows. From
the overall sample, I identify domestic firms that are observed one year prior to acquisition
and henceforth are acquired by either a HMT or OECD investor and remain under that
particular foreign ownership for two years after acquisition. Thus, the sample consists of
firms that are acquired between 1999 and 2004.21 Foreign acquisition is defined as an event
where the foreign equity share equals or exceeds 25%.22 The final matching sample used in
the analysis consists of 1,493 firms acquired by OECD investors and each of these firms is
paired with a firm from a group of 1,813 firms acquired by HMT investors.23 Table A2

20The

NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese indigenous
privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section of China
Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in the
China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset.
To alleviate concerns that only survivors and by implication higher productivity firms are disproportionately
included in the sample, I calculate the exit rates for acquired firms, differentiated by the origin of the investor,
who drop out of the sample in years t+1 and t+2 respectively. The exit rates do not differ substantially by
investor type lending confidence that the sample of OECD and HMT-acquired firms are comparable.
21

22

This threshold is set by the Chinese government.

The original sample consisted of 1,798 firms acquired by OECD investors and 2,151 firms acquired by HMT
investors. Of those acquired by OECD (HMT) investors, 304 (338) change two-digit industry categories in the
23
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provides a breakdown of the number of acquired firms by two-digit industry under the
Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC).
I estimate the marginal probabilities using what Lechner (2002a) calls the structural
approach where “the idea is to formulate the complete choice problem in one model and
estimate it on the full sample.” (p. 209). Therefore, for constructing the propensity scores, I
utilize the full sample to model the separate marginal probabilities of being acquired by
either an OECD or HMT investor using a multinomial logit model. The advantage of the
structural approach is the ease of understating the empirical factors behind the joint selection
process as opposed to computing binary conditional choices, one at a time.24

2.4.1

Productivity
The key outcome variable of interest in this study is firm-level total factor

productivity (TFP). TFP is an indirect measure of technology transfer in that it is an
outcome due to gains in efficiency following technological diffusion after an acquisition
(Keller 2004, 2010). Unavailability of data prohibits the use of more direct measures such as
expenditure on patent licensing fees or payments for blueprints of technology.
Using TFP levels as a measure of technology transfer, however, could pose a
particular challenge. Keller (2004, 2010) cautions that TFP may suffer from measurement
error, due to usage of the values of outputs and inputs rather than the physical quantities.
Thus, gains due to technological transfers may be confounded by higher mark-ups. This
post-acquisition period and are consequently dropped to ensure comparison within the same industry. 1
OECD-acquired firm was not on the common support and also excluded from the analysis.
Lechner (2002a) calls computing binary conditional choices one at a time the reduced form approach. He
finds that in application, the matching estimators using the reduced form versus the structural approach yield
similar results.
24
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paper considers changes in TFP as opposed to TFP levels in order to mitigate concerns
about measurement error. Keller (2004, 2010) argues that considering changes in TFP as
opposed to level “will help in identifying technology if spurious factors do not change over
time, or more generally, if they change less than technology.”
Total factor productivity is measured as the residual of a Cobb-Douglas production
function estimation. Specifically, TFP of a firm in period is,

(

The input coefficients,

).

and

(2.4.1.1)

, are first determined by estimating,

(2.4.1.2)

where

represents the part of productivity shock that is observed by the firm but

unobserved by the econometrician and
other inputs. Since the firm observes

represents an error term uncorrelated with the
, the unobserved component of productivity could

affect input choices so that OLS yields inconsistent estimates of the production factors
(Marschak and Andrews, 1944).
To address this potential simultaneity bias, I employ the semi-parametric method
proposed by Levinsohn and Petrin (2003).25 I estimate the production function for each CIC
four digit industry to allow the returns to inputs to vary across industries. This procedure
uses intermediate inputs to proxy for the unobservable productivity shock,
25

Carried out using the Stata module levpet (Petrin, Poi, Levinsohn, 2004).
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.

Computation of TFP using the Levinsohn and Petrin (2003) method requires information
on firm value added, labor, capital and intermediate inputs. The dataset provides information
on nominal values of firm value added, capital, and intermediate inputs. These are converted
to real terms using the output, investment, and input deflators, respectively, in Brandt et al.
(2009).26 In addition, an alternative measure of productivity, labor productivity, is used to
establish robustness of the results to different measures of productivity.

2.5

Results

2.5.1 Multiple Treatment Matching Results
Two marginal probabilities must be estimated to construct the counterfactuals for
the pool of firms acquired by OECD investors. The first is the probability that a domestic
Chinese firm is acquired by an OECD investor, ̂

( ), and the second is the probability

that a domestic Chinese firm is acquired by a HMT investor, ̂

( ), both conditional on

observable characteristics, . I obtain these probabilities through estimation of the
multinomial logit model in (2.2.4). Explanatory variables that affect both the treatment
(acquired by an OECD investor) as well as the outcome (total factor productivity) are
included in this equation.27 The choice of variables is also guided by existing literature
including Huang, Ma, Yang, Zhang (2008), Arnold and Javorcik (2004), Petkova (2008), and
Chen (2009). All explanatory variables are measured as of the pre-acquisition period.
Evidence suggests that foreign investors rely on observable characteristics of a target
firm to make acquisition decisions (Arnold and Javorcik, 2004; Chen, 2009) making it more
26

The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.

27

See Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008) for a discussion of implementing propensity score matching techniques.
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likely that CIA holds. However, there might be concerns that selection of targets by
acquirers could be guided by unobservable preferential policy treatments that vary over time.
Selection on unobservables will pose challenges for identification in this study if OECD
investors received preferential treatment over HMT investors. However, evidence suggests
otherwise. Huang, Jin, Qian (2010) document that Chinese domestic policy has been
uniformly non-discriminatory for all FDI since the early 1990s.
Variables included in the multinomial logit model are pre-acquisition TFP, sales and
sales squared, age and age squared, capital to labor ratio, wage per worker, share of exports
in total sales, share of equity held by the state in total capital28 Inclusion of TFP is intended
to control for any selection on productivity such as “cherry-picking”, a phenomenon where
some foreign firms acquire better performing domestic firms. Because TFP is a generated
regressor, standard errors are bootstrapped. Total sales proxy for firm size. Age captures the
stage of development of the firm as well as variations in production and management
experiences. It also acts as a control for survival of more productive companies. Capital per
worker is a measure of the potential productive capacity of the firm embodied in its capital
stock. Average enterprise wage captures the average skill level of the domestic firm‟s labor.
Share of exports in total sales is indicative of the level of integration of the firm in world
markets.
In addition, the model includes a set of year, two-digit industry, and region fixed
effects.29 Year dummies control for macroeconomic shocks, such as inflation and other
28

All nominal values are converted to real values.

Regions are comprised of the following groups of provinces – (i) Coastal: Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong,
Hainan, Jiangsu, Shandong, Tianjin, Zhejiang, Hebei; (ii) Inland: Shanxi, Anhui, Jiangxi, Henan, Hubei, Hunan;
(iii) Northeast: Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang; (iv) Southwest: Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan, Chongqing;
(v) Northwest: Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Shaanxi, Gansu, Qinghai, Ningxia, Xinjiang.
29
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national shocks. Industry dummies control for industry specific technology, skill
requirements, and other industry specific common shocks. Region dummies control for
location specific natural resources, infrastructure, and policies. Region dummies further
control for the scale of activity or agglomeration of firms. For instance, OECD (HMT)
investors who acquire targets in a region where there are other OECD (HMT) firms may
face lower fixed costs of acquisition due to pre-established networks that reduce the cost of
acquiring information.
Table 2.2 reports the coefficients from the multinomial logit model. Results indicate
that smaller (proxied by sales), older, more export-oriented and firms with lower capitallabor ratios and higher state equity shares are more likely to be acquired by either OECD or
HMT investors. The coefficients on TFP, although not significant at conventional levels,
along with the coefficients on wage per worker suggest that more productive firms are more
attractive to OECD compared to HMT investors. After obtaining ̂

( ) and ̂

( )

for every target firm, I apply one-to-one Mahalanobis matching to assign a counterfactual
firm for every OECD target.
To assess how well the propensity score matching performs, tests of the balancing
hypothesis are carried out and presented in Appendix 2A. The first test calculates the
standardized bias for each of the covariates included in the multinomial logit model. This
measures the distance in marginal distributions of the covariates and is defined as the
difference in the sample means of the OECD-acquired and HMT-acquired firms weighted
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by the square root of the average sample variances in both groups.30 A bias reduction of 3 to
5% once matching has been performed is considered to be sufficient (Caliendo and
Kopeinig, 2008). The second test compares the sample means between OECD-acquired and
HMT-acquired firms before and after matching. The expectation is that prior to matching
we should find that the difference between the means are statistically significant which
becomes statistically insignificant after matching. Both sets of tests pass the required
standards. Also, on average, the absolute distance in terms of the multivariate score between
the matched pairs is 0.02, a measure that is bound between 0 and 1. These results from tests
of the balancing hypothesis show that matching is capable of creating a control group that is
very similar to the treatment group in the pre-acquisition period.

2.5.2

Baseline Results from Matching Difference-in-Differences
Table 2.3 provides the baseline results. The upper panel reports results on TFP and

the lower panel considers labor productivity measured as the logarithm of value added per
worker. The estimator reported is the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) from
(2.3.2.2), which is the average difference in TFP between the matched pair of firms, net of
the initial difference in the pre-acquisition period. In the year of acquisition, the ATT is
equal to 0.123. This means that having accounted for the initial difference between the two
groups, OECD-acquired firms exhibit 12.3% higher TFP compared to HMT-acquired firms.
The TFP differential is 11.1% in the year after acquisition. By the third year, it increases to
24.5%. These effects are all statistically significant. Focusing on labor productivity, I observe

30
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are the same for the matched sample.
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; where

and

are the treated and

similar patterns. In the year of acquisition, OECD-acquired firms exhibit 17.7% higher
productivity relative to HMT-acquired firms. This difference persists in the year after at
15.3% and reaches 22.4% in the third year. These effects are also statistically significant.
The productivity gains are highest in the year of acquisition and relatively modest
thereafter. This pattern is similar to that found for domestic firms who are acquired by
foreign firms in Indonesia (Arnold and Javorcik, 2009).31 I also find that the positive TFP
differential is not a result of decreases in TFP at HMT-acquired firms in the post-acquisition
period.32 Both acquired groups of firms experience higher TFP in the post-acquisition
period. However, the increase is larger for OECD-acquired firms in the post-acquisition
period. These results suggest that OECD ownership confers a productivity advantage
relative to HMT ownership.

2.5.3 Endogeneity
This paper identifies the differential causal impact of OECD versus HMT ownership
on Chinese target firm performance using a propensity score matching difference in
differences approach. The identification assumption underlying this approach is that there is
no role for time varying unobservable factors in the foreign acquisition decision. In the
context of this study, one type of unobservable time varying factor that might be cause for
potential concern is the possibility that relative to HMT investors, OECD investors are

Using propensity score matching difference-in-differences technique, the authors find that ATT using TFP is
0.106, 0.122, and 0.135 in the year of acquisition, one and two years after respectively. Arnold and Javorcik
(2009) do not distinguish between the different sources of FDI. The comparison is between firms who were
acquired by foreign firms and those that remained domestic owned.
31

For example, the average TFP of OECD (HMT) acquired firms is 6.06 (6.096) in the pre-acquisition period
and increases to 6.281 (6.194) in the year of acquisition.
32
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better at identifying and acting on information not directly available from financial
statements and other observable target characteristics. For example, OECD investors could
be better at identifying talented managers who would contribute to the future growth of the
firm. These types of information differ from “hard” verifiable information and are referred
to as “soft” information in the finance and accounting literatures (Stein, 2002).
To address concerns of particular time varying unobservable characteristics driving
the results such as OECD investors‟ superior ability to gather “soft” information compared
to HMT investors, I carry out two checks. First, I focus on acquisitions that take place in
HMT-dense provinces. Figure 2.2 shows the distribution of the number of foreign projects
by type of investor across China‟s twenty eight provinces.
I consider provinces to be HMT-dense where the share of HMT projects in total
number of foreign projects exceeds 70%.33 Since HMT investors share cultural, business and
family ties to mainland China, we would expect these investors to have an advantage over
OECD investors in gathering “soft” information in HMT-dense provinces. Therefore, if we
observe an OECD ownership premium even in these provinces it would allay fears that the
results are not predominantly being driven by such time varying unobservable factors. Panel
(a) in Table 2.4 presents the results for log profits and panel (b) for log total factor
productivity. Looking at both panels, it indeed appears that HMT investors may have an
advantage over OECD investors in the year of acquisition as suggested by the negative

These include provinces of Henan, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Inner Mongolia, and Guangxi. The
results are qualitatively similar if I focus only on those provinces where the HMT share in investment exceeds
80%, namely provinces of Jiangxi and Fujian.
33
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results. However, by the second and third year after acquisition, OECD-acquired targets
exhibit both higher profits and higher productivity compared to HMT-acquired targets.34
Second, I divide the acquired sample by those that are state-owned versus those that
are domestic private-owned in the pre-acquisition period. Peng (2006) cautions foreign
investors to consider particular characteristics of Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs)
prior to acquisition. One is that SOEs are characterized by organizational slack. However,
their books could show high depreciation and reserve funds as well as retained earnings that
would provide an inaccurate picture of the firm. The other cautionary characteristic is that
SOEs are known to maintain three sets of books – one for administrative superiors
exaggerating performance, one for tax purposes underreporting performance, and finally one
for the managers themselves accurately reflecting performance. Foreign investors are likely
to be shown the books exaggerating performance. In light of these SOE characteristics, we
would expect foreign investors to conduct more careful due diligence both in terms of
“hard” and “soft‟ information when considering state compared to domestic private targets.
Therefore, if “soft” information was a major driver of the results, we would expect the
performance of OECD acquired targets that were state-owned in the pre-acquisition period
to differ markedly, in particular be higher, compared to private-owned targets.
Table 2.5 displays the results for log of total factor productivity divided by the two
target ownership types in the pre-acquisition period. We see that in all years after acquisition,
both types of OECD-acquired targets are more productive than their HMT-acquired
counterparts. The performance of OECD relative to HMT acquired firms do not differ by

The results are not significant at conventional levels, except for profit differential in the third year of
acquisition, which is most likely due to the reduction in sample size.
34
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the target ownership type.35 Together, the results in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 provide robust
evidence of persistent OECD relative to HMT ownership premium.

2.5.4 What Explains the OECD Productivity Premium?
To understand the restructuring process that takes place after a foreign acquisition,
as well as the factors that might explain the differential increase in TFP in OECD-acquired
firms relative to HMT-acquired firms, I consider several other outcomes. These results are
presented in Table 2.6. Since it is hypothesized that OECD multinationals have a higher
fixed cost of acquisition, it should be the case that post-acquisition the OECD-acquired
firms exhibit higher profits to justify their willingness to incur the higher fixed cost of
acquisition. Changes in log of total profits between the two acquired groups of firms support
this framework. Panel (a) in Table 5 shows that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECDacquired firms experience higher total profits in all years during and after acquisition. The
difference is in the order of 26.6%, 35.3%, and 52.3% for the year of, one and two years
after acquisition, respectively.36
Similar analyses are conducted for five additional outcomes: changes in average
wage, employment, capital intensity (capital-labor ratio), export intensity (export to sales
ratio), and innovation intensity (the share of new product output value in total sales)
between the acquired firms. Panel (b) shows that OECD-acquired firms pay higher average
Pair-wise t-tests of differences in mean differential productivity between the two ownership types reject the
null at the 1% significance level.
35

There might be concern that relative to OECD firms, HMT firms engage more in transfer pricing which
leads to lower reported profits. However, Huang, Jin, and Qian (2010) do not find evidence to support that
lower profits in HMT firms are a result of transfer pricing activities. Moreover, Chan and Chow (1997) do not
find evidence to support transfer pricing activities by foreign owned firms, either HMT or non-HMT,
operating in China.
36
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wages in each year post-acquisition. Higher average wages could mean that OECD-acquired
firms employ higher skilled workers on average. However, panel (c) shows that OECDacquired firms do not experience changes in employment relative to HMT-acquired firms.
The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production do not provide information by skill level of
workers in all years. Therefore, I cannot directly observe changes in the skill intensity of the
labor force post-acquisition, which would have provided evidence that the productivity
differential between OECD and HMT-acquired firms is driven partly by changes in skill
composition. If higher average wages are not a result of employing more skilled worker, it is
also consistent with workers becoming more productive once they are under new
management. Such an interpretation suggests that OECD-acquired firms bring superior
management know-how that reduces waste and increases labor productivity.
Referring to panel (d), we see that relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired
firms increase the amount of capital per worker in the year of acquisition while the increase
is more modest in the following two years. Capital intensity increases differentially by 21.5%,
25.9%, and 21.4% respectively in these years and these results are statistically significant.
The largest increase is in the year of acquisition which is also the same time period when I
observe the largest increase in TFP. This suggests that OECD investors immediately
improve capital in the acquired firms.
Next, I consider if OECD-acquired firms export a larger share of their output.
Productivity differential could be driven by “learning by exporting” effects where knowledge
transfer occurs via exporting activity. However, results show that OECD-acquired firms do
not raise the share of exports in total sales any more or less than HMT-acquired firms. Recall
that domestic Chinese firms with high exports to sales ratios were more likely to be acquired
31

by both types of investors (see Table 2.2). It is possible that the acquired firms were already
well integrated into world markets and therefore there are limited opportunities for
knowledge transfer via the exporting channel.
Finally, under panel (f), I look for changes in innovative activity in the acquired
firms, measured as the output value of new products produced in a given year as a share of
total sales. The idea is that if OECD firms operate on the frontiers of world technology
relative to HMT firms, they are more likely to introduce product innovation within the
acquired firm. Results show that there is no difference in changes to innovation intensity of
OECD relative to HMT-acquired firms.37
The evidence presented so far reveal that the likely source of the TFP differential
between OECD and HMT acquired firms is technology transfer embodied in the capital
brought in by OECD investors. Evidence also suggests that OCED investors might also be
introducing management techniques that boost worker productivity and thereby reduce
inefficiencies.

2.5.5 Technology Transfer and Domestic Content
To explore the technology transfer channel further, I distinguish between industries
with high and low domestic content in production. Domestic content embodies the
domestic value added in the production process. In particular, I consider the role of
domestic content in exports due to the pervasive nature of export processing in Chinese
The new product output value is zero for most firms and becomes positive over the sample period for a
given firm leading to different sample sizes each year. Expenditures on R&D would have been a better measure
of innovative activity since new products might take time to introduce while R&D activity could begin
relatively soon. However, data on R&D expenditures are only available for the years 2005 and 2006 so that
changes in this outcome cannot be measured for my sample. Post-acquisition differential changes in intangible
assets in the share of total assets were also found to be insignificant.
37
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trade and the important role of foreign firms. In 2002, the share of processing exports in
total Chinese exports was 60% while processing exports accounted for 71% of exports by
Sino-foreign joint venture firms (Koopman, Wei, Zhang, 2008).38 The scope for
improvement in TFP via technology transfer is expected to be greater in industries where the
domestic content in production is higher. In industries with low domestic content, the
production process could simply involve assembling imported parts into a final good or
processing according to foreign specifications leaving no room for innovation.39 For
example, Chinese workers account for only about 3% of the value added for one iPod
assembled in China and exported to the U.S.40 Therefore, there may be little scope for
technology transfer in industries characterized by low domestic content.
Dean, Fung, and Zhang (forthcoming) measure domestic content by input-output
sectors.41 Using the concordance provided in Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang (2009), the inputoutput sectors are matched to four-digit industries under the Chinese Industrial
Classification. Then using the domestic content for each four-digit industry within a twodigit industry, an average is computed at the two-digit industry level.42 Appendix 2B provides
a ranking of the two-digit industries by domestic content. We see that the industries with
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In 2002, processing exports accounted for 87.9% of total exports by wholly owned foreign firms.

39

See Feenstra and Hanson (2005) for details on China‟s export processing regime.

Koopman, Wang, Wei (2008) provide citations that estimate the value added attributable to Chinese workers
to be about $4 for a unit of 30GB video model of the iPod whose total export value in 2006 was $150.
40

Dean, Fung, Wang (2007) provide estimates of vertical specialization (VS) by sector which represents the
foreign content in exports. Domestic content is calculated as (1 - VS).
41

For example, the VS measures for four-digit industries 2412 (“Pen manufacturing”) and 2440 (“Toy
manufacturing”) are 0.028 and 0.132 respectively. Therefore, the average for two-digit industry 24
(“Manufacture of articles for culture education, and sport activity”) is 0.08 and the domestic content is
calculated as (1 – 0.08) = 0.92. The VS numbers used are from the last column in Table 3 in Dean, Fung,
Zhang (2007)
42
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high domestic content are what might traditionally be considered less technologically
sophisticated.43 Industries that are thought to have higher technology content or to be R&D
intensive actually have very low domestic content in their exports.
Table 2.7 extends the baseline results by differentiating industries with high and low
domestic content in exports. We find that, post-acquisition, the productivity differential
between OECD and HMT-acquired firms is most pronounced in high domestic content
industries. This is consistent with the idea that the productivity advantage is due to transfer
of technology from OECD partners in terms of technological, management, or marketing
know-how. These results are also consistent with the finding in Hu, Jefferson, and Jinchang
(2005) that foreign technology transfer in China (measured as a firm‟s expenditure on
technology purchased from a foreign provider such as payments for blueprints of
technology) is more intensive in less technologically advanced industries.44

2.6

Matching within Industry
Although controls for two-digit industry fixed effects are included in the multinomial

logit model used to construct the propensity scores, the HMT-acquired firms that form the
comparison group are not necessarily chosen from within the same industry as the OECDacquired firms. In general, the sample size does not allow it. Therefore, a potential concern is
that industry sorting could be driving the differences in post-acquisition TFP. Appendix 2C
provides the number of acquisitions within each two-digit industry. We see that the number
Dean, Fung, Zhang (2007) define an industry to be highly vertically specialized if the foreign content of
exports exceeds 25%. Following their definition, an industry is categorized as having high domestic content if
the domestic content of exports exceeds 75%.
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Hu, Jefferson, Jinchang (2005) categorize the following industries as less technologically advanced – tobacco,
textile, apparel, leather, furniture, paper, printing, and rubber.
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of acquisitions by the two types of investors is similar within each industry providing a
relatively limited pool to choose from. The average treatment effect on the treated is
identified only in the region of common support. To ensure that there is sufficient overlap
between the two groups a larger number of HMT-acquired firms would increase the
likelihood of better matches for each OECD-acquired firm propelling the choice to match
across industries having controlled for industry effects in the propensity score estimation.
Previous studies of the impact of foreign ownership on domestic firm productivity
using matching difference-in-differences technique face similar constraints. For example,
Petkova (2008) and Chen (2009) who study Indian and U.S. firms, respectively, carry out
their difference-in-differences analyses after matching across industries. A notable exception
is Arnold and Javorcik (2009), who study post-acquisition TFP gains to Indonesian firms
and conduct their analysis after matching within the same four-digit industry as well as year
when the foreign acquisition occurred. Their counterfactual is constructed from the universe
of all domestic Indonesian firms employing more than twenty workers, providing a
sufficiently large pool for selecting good matches.
To attenuate concerns about matching across industries, I repeat the matching
difference-in-differences analysis for the group of acquired firms within the textile industry
only. I group the textile industry to be composed of two-digit industries 17 (Manufacture of
Textile) and 18 (Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps). The textile
industry provides the largest number of HMT-acquired firms relative to OECD-acquired
firms to choose and, thus, provide a sufficient pool for matching. There are a total of 416
possible HMT-acquired firms that can potentially be matched to the 258 OECD-acquired
firms.
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The multinomial logit model and the results from the balancing tests are provided in
Appendix 2D and 2E respectively. The coefficients in Appendix 2D, for multinomial logit
model, are similar to those in Table 2 for all industries. The balancing tests in Appendix 2E
show that overall, matching reduces the standardized bias by at least 3-5% while the t-tests
yield statistically insignificant differences between the mean of the variables once matching is
performed.45
The matching difference-in-differences results for textiles only are presented in Table
2.8. We find that OECD-acquired firms exhibit higher TFP in all years after acquisition
although the result is only statistically significant in the year of acquisition. The results are
imprecisely measured in the following two years and are likely a result of the reduced sample
size. However, the pattern of results is similar to those reported in Table 2.3 where the
largest increase in TFP occurs in the year of acquisition. Carrying out the analysis within the
same industry and finding evidence of higher TFP in OECD-acquired firms lends
confidence that the main results are not being driven by industry differences.

2.7

Conclusions
Developing countries compete to attract foreign direct investment in hopes of

bridging the technology gap with advanced nations and spurring economic growth.
Multinational firms are viewed as conduits of sophisticated know-how, management
techniques and marketing skills. However, an overwhelming share of global R&D activity
undertaken in OECD countries suggests that the source of foreign investment is an
The standardized bias actually increases and the t-tests are significant for sales and capital per worker after
matching. However, the average absolute distance between the matched pairs in terms of
( ) ̂
( )] is only 0.12, a measure that is bound between 0 and 1.
[̂
45
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important determinant of how much technology transfer actually occurs. Although we may
expect the possibility of technology transfer to increase with the superiority in technological
capabilities of multinational firms, host-country firms in a developing country like China may
not have the capacity to absorb superior know-how into their production processes. This
study compares the performance of domestic Chinese firms acquired by OECD and HMT
investors to search for the extent of such transfers. In particular, every OECD-acquired firm
is matched with a HMT-acquired firm and we look for changes in TFP between these two
groups of firms in the post-acquisition period.
We find that OECD-acquired firms outperform HMT-acquired firms. In particular,
relative to HMT-acquired firms, OECD-acquired firms experience higher productivity in the
initial year of acquisition and this productivity differential persists in subsequent years,
reaching 24.5% in the third year. Further, post-acquisition increases in average wages
accompanied by no changes in total employment and increases in capital usage per worker
point to the introduction of management techniques that reduce labor inefficiencies along
with capital deepening as likely sources of the TFP increase.
These results suggest that the development level of the investor source country
affects the opportunities for technology transfer differentially and underscore the
importance of distinguishing between sources of FDI. Since evidence shows that OECD
multinationals have superior technological capabilities relative to HMT multinationals, we
could infer that Chinese firms are closer, with respect to capabilities, to HMT compared to
OECD firms. The results can then be interpreted to imply that there are more opportunities
for productivity improvement if the capability gap between acquirer and target are
sufficiently large. This interpretation is akin to studies that relate absorptive capacity of
37

domestic firms to their ability to benefit from FDI spillovers, such as Blalock and Gertler
(2009) who find that firms with smaller “technology gap” benefit less from FDI than those
with weaker technological competencies. The results can also be interpreted as showing that
ethnic ties do not necessarily lead to better firm performance, a finding also corroborated by
Huang, Jin, and Qian (2010).
Looking across industry groups, we further find that the productivity differential is
most pronounced in industries with high domestic content. This finding has important
policy implications for countries heavily engaged in export processing activities. If the local
economy specializes in a narrow range of activities it makes it unlikely for productivity gains
to materialize from foreign direct investment via the technology transfer channel.
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________________________________________________________________________

3. FDI, Agglomeration Economies, and Productivity:
Evidence from China
______________________________________________________
3.1 Introduction
The presence of foreign multinational companies (MNCs) in a country alters the
economic landscape in which domestic enterprises operate. MNCs typically bring with them
advanced technology that is believed to generate knowledge spillovers to domestic
enterprises (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). However, foreign presence also tends to increase
competition in input markets for skilled labor (Driffield and Taylor, 2000) as well as in
output markets (Aitken and Harrison,1999). Increased competition for skilled labor could
diminish the gains to domestic enterprises of locating in close proximity to own-industry
activity (Combes and Duranton, 2006) while output market competition could generate
negative market stealing effects. On the one hand, the presence of MNCs can strengthen the
forces that attract domestic enterprises to locate in close proximity (localization economies)
via increased opportunity for knowledge spillovers.46 On the other hand, the presence of
MNCs can diminish the value of localization economies via increased competition for skilled
labor, a phenomenon known as “labor poaching” as well as via negative competitive forces
in output markets. This paper provides empirical evidence on the net effect between positive
localization economies and negative competition forces arising in the presence of MNCs.
The analysis is carried out by ranking enterprises and nearby activity, in ascending
order of productivity, into state, private and foreign owned enterprises operating in China.
46

See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a survey of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies.
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China provides a suitable setting due to a well-established productivity hierarchy among
these three broad ownership types. On average, foreign-owned enterprises (FOEs) operating
in China are more productive than their domestic counterparts; and among domestic-owned
enterprises, the private-owned enterprises (POEs) are more productive compared to stateowned enterprises (SOEs) (Wen, Li, Lloyd, 2002; Zhang, Zhang, Zhao, 2001).47 Ownership
type of an enterprise embodies enterprise-specific assets such as technology, brand name,
managerial know-how, local networks, etc. which are associated positively with
productivity.48 Studies looking at how organization of economic activity within a city affects
the value of agglomeration find that industrial structure and corporate organization are
important determinants (Rosenthal and Strange, 2003 and 2008). Thus, there is reason to
believe that the coexistence of various ownership types alters the opportunity and value of
localization spillovers.
This paper combines insights from the agglomeration literature and the study of
spillovers from foreign direct investment (FDI), similar in spirit to Mayer et al (2010), to
analyze interactions among enterprises within an industry-city space.49 This paper makes
three contributions. First, the agglomeration literature posits location specific externalities to
extend along three dimensions – spatial, industrial and temporal.50 However, firms may be
It is accepted as conventional wisdom that MNCs exhibit superior performance in comparison to domestic
firms in many countries, not only in China. See Arnold and Javorcik (2009) for specific examples.
47
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See Syverson (2010) for a survey of firm-specific factors that affect productivity.

Mayer et al (2010) analyze firm location decisions incorporating trade economists‟ views on why firms locate
abroad and urban economists‟ views on inter-city location patterns.
49

For example, using data on new firm births in the U.S., Rosenthal and Strange (2003) find that localization
economies attenuate rapidly in the first few miles and then much slowly over longer distances. Using U.S. plant
level data, Henderson (2003) finds that localization economies have a positive effect on plant level productivity
in high tech industries but not in machinery industries. Henderson (2003) also finds that firms in high tech
industries benefit from scale of past own industry activity.
50
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„nearer‟ or „farther‟ from each other in a fourth dimension that may not be captured by
industrial, physical, or temporal distance, namely technological distance. I organize
enterprises by their ownership types capturing enterprise-specific assets that differ across
enterprises albeit within the same industrial, geographic, and temporal space.51 This
organization allows me to observe attenuation of localization spillovers as enterprise
ownership structure becomes dissimilar.
Second, empirical studies in the agglomeration literature are predominantly based in
developed country settings. In most developed countries production units are privately
owned and policy biases towards particular ownership types are absent. In contrast, the
industrial ownership structure in developing countries, particularly in transition economies
like China, differs substantially.52 The state has a significant presence and often enacts
policies biased in favor of state-owned enterprises.53 In addition, governments are eager to
attract foreign direct investment (FDI) leading to the coexistence of domestic and foreign
enterprises, which differ from each other, notably in terms of productivity.
China provides a unique setting to investigate heterogeneity in firms‟ responses to
economic activity in own and across ownership types due to the coexistence of enterprises
under various ownership structures.54 Since opening its economy in 1978, China‟s economic
landscape has transformed from being entirely composed of thousands of state-owned
enterprises to one shared by private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises. For instance, in

Rosenthal and Strange (2003) organize establishments by size and by subsidiary and non-subsidiary status to
search for evidence of the importance of industrial structure and corporate organization, respectively.
51
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See Brandt, Rawski, Sutton (2008) for an overview of China‟s industrial development.

53

See Huang (2003) for a discussion of policy biases against China‟s domestic private-owned enterprises.

54

See Naughton (2007, p. 298 – 304) for details on the evolution of ownership types in China.
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1980, state-owned enterprises accounted for 81% of industrial output and only 41% in 2005;
private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises accounted for 27% and 30% of total
industrial output respectively in 2005 (Perkins and Rawski, 2008). Figure 3.1 shows a similar
trend for employment.
The third contribution is to the literature on foreign direct investment, which has
extensively studied the spillover effects of foreign enterprises on their domestic
counterparts. However, studies focusing on potential spillovers in the opposite direction,
from domestic to foreign enterprises, are less common (some exceptions include Li, Liu,
Parker, 2001 and Chang and Xu, 2008). Organizing enterprises by their ownership types
permits a focus on interactions between foreign and domestic enterprises, allowing
measurement of spillovers in both directions. Evidence of positive spillovers from domestic
to foreign enterprises has policy implications for the importance of indigenous private
enterprises in the market reform process in China.
I estimate differences in the strength of localization spillovers within and across
ownership types using enterprise level data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China
during 1998-2006. The data comes from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production.55 The
dataset contains detailed information on the ownership structure of an enterprise in addition
to enterprise level inputs and output. I estimate an augmented production function for
enterprises in each type, including measures of intra-industry employment differentiated by
ownership types within a city. In addition, the preferred specification includes industry and

The Annual Surveys of Industrial Production is not a plant level dataset. However, the majority of
observations are of single-plant operations mitigating concerns about measurement error in the localization
variables. See Section 4 for a detailed discussion.
55
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city by year fixed effects to control for a range of industry specific and time varying city level
characteristics that potentially impact enterprise level productivity.
This paper offers three core results. First, within the same ownership type (owntype), I find evidence of traditional localization economies consistent with a large literature
on agglomeration economies. Second, across different ownership types (cross-type),
spillovers differ in two ways. They tend to be much weaker compared to within ownership
type spillovers. In addition, spillovers from more productive foreign to less productive
domestic enterprises are smaller than spillovers in the reverse direction. This asymmetric
pattern of spillovers is consistent with labor poaching at work in the presence of foreign
multinational companies. Finally, I find positive productivity spillovers from domestic
private-owned enterprises to all ownership types, suggesting the importance of this emerging
group in the Chinese economy.
As an additional exercise, I further decompose foreign enterprises into those
originating from ethnically Chinese economies (ECEs) and those enterprises originating
primarily from OECD countries (non-ECEs) allowing for the possibility of ethnic business
networks influencing the value of localization economies.56 The basic patterns discussed
above still persist, but the decomposition allows us to observe that private-owned
enterprises benefit from the presence of non-ECEs while state-owned enterprises do not.
Notably, I find that nearby activity in ECEs has no impact on productivity of non-ECEs and
vice versa. This result offers preliminary evidence on relationships between MNCs,
particularly between MNCs operating at different technology levels.

56

Kerr (2008) provides evidence of knowledge diffusion through ethnic networks.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a conceptual framework for
understanding why we would expect differences in localization spillovers within own and
across different ownership types and develops a set of testable hypotheses. Section 3.3
presents the empirical specification and discusses estimation issues. Section 3.4 describes the
data and measurement of key variables. Section 3.5 presents the empirical findings and the
final section concludes.

3.2. Ownership Type and Differential Localization Spillovers
Foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises in China have different productivity
profiles. FOEs are more productive than POEs who are, in turn, more productive than
SOEs, giving rise to a distinct productivity hierarchy. This productivity hierarchy has
implications for the ability of enterprises to benefit from traditional localization economies
(labor market pooling, input sharing, knowledge spillovers) and withstand negative
competition for skilled labor (labor poaching).
Evidence from the literature on spillovers from FDI emphasizes the importance of
absorptive capacity of an enterprise to internalize potential spillovers.57 A common measure
of absorptive capacity is a firm‟s distance to the industry‟s technology frontier.58 Using data
on U.K. firms, Girma (2005) finds that the industry leaders are predominantly foreign firms
and that spillovers increase with absorptive capacity but up to a threshold level beyond

The usage of the term absorptive capacity closely follows Cohen and Levinthal (1990) who describe it as the
“ability to recognize value of new information, assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends” (p.128).
57

The distance is computed as the difference between the productivity of the industry leader(s) and the
productivity of the individual firm.
58
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which spillovers diminish. He also finds that there is a minimum absorptive capacity
threshold level below which spillovers from FDI are very small or even negative.
Appealing to the productivity hierarchy among the three ownership types in China,
we make a set of assumptions about the absorptive capacity of enterprises in each type. First,
we assume that of the three sources of traditional localization economies, strength of
knowledge spillovers is most directly affected by an enterprise‟s absorptive capacity. FOEs
are known to use more sophisticated technology and management strategies and thus, we
expect knowledge spillovers to flow from FOEs to domestic-owned enterprises. POEs,
being generally more productive than SOEs, are expected to benefit more from foreign
presence.59 Lastly, we expect SOEs to benefit from nearby presence of both FOEs and
POEs. However, benefits from co-location with POEs are expected to be larger than that
from foreign presence because the productivity gap between SOEs and POEs is smaller than
that between SOEs and FOEs.
The presence of foreign companies increases competition in both the domestic
output and input markets. However, competition in the output market is less of a concern in
this study.60 Typically, final output markets span larger geographic areas than cities such as
the province where the company resides, other provinces, or overseas markets. In fact, a
significant portion of inward FDI in China is export-oriented (Zhang, 2005). These foreign
companies produce almost exclusively for export markets. This leads us to believe that
within an industry-city space, competition in input markets is a more important outcome
from foreign presence.
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Hale and Long (2006) find that POEs in China benefit more from foreign presence than SOEs.
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See Aitken and Harrison (1999) for evidence of negative output market competition from FDI.
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Input competition arises when an enterprise endowed with superior enterprisespecific assets, therefore more productive, lures away skilled workers from its rivals by
offering higher wages. This “labor poaching” assumes that higher skilled workers boost the
productivity of firms to justify offering higher wages. Labor poaching diminishes the
benefits from co-location (Combes and Duranton, 2006). Foreign firms, in general, are
known to pay higher wages and there is some evidence that they attract the best workers
away from domestic firms (Gorg, Strobl, Walsh, 2007). In China, Cai, Park, and Zhao (2008)
find that the returns to education are higher in nonpublic enterprises. Zhao (2002) finds that
unskilled workers earned significantly less in foreign-invested enterprises compared to those
in the state sector while the opposite is true of skilled workers.
Although China‟s comparative advantage is in cheap, unskilled labor, it has a
growing pool of skilled workers. For example, Yan (2010) writes in a recent article in China
Daily that U.S. MNC, Pfizer, is making plans to open up a new R&D center in the city of
Wuhan to tap into low cost, high skilled university-educated workers. Science parks are
another example where MNCs tap into highly skilled workers from nearby research
universities (Todo, Zhang, Zhou, 2009). Strong demand for skilled workers from foreign
enterprises is reciprocated by a strong desire from workers to be employed at MNCs in
China. Wall Street Journal correspondent Leslie Chang (2009) provides some anecdotal
evidence. One of the workers she interviewed in the province of Guangdong succinctly
relates that “American and European bosses treated workers best, followed by Japanese,
Korean, Hong Kong, and then Taiwanese factory owners. Domestic Chinese factories were
the worst, because they “always go bankrupt”.” (p. 27).
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Taken together, we can expect to see asymmetry in the labor poaching effect poaching would lead skilled workers to flow from less productive towards more productive
enterprises. In the Chinese context, FOEs, endowed with superior firm-specific assets,
would be able to successfully poach the high skilled workers away from domestic-owned
enterprises by offering higher wages. Similarly, within the domestic-owned enterprises,
POEs would have the ability to offers higher wages and entice skilled workers away from
SOEs.
To summarize the discussion above, Table 3.1 compiles the anticipated effects of
nearby own-industry activity by ownership type on enterprise level productivity. The
leftmost column indicates the ownership type of intra-industry activity and the topmost row
indicates the ownership type of the sample of enterprises. We expect the diagonal terms to
be positive and largest in each column since productivity distance between „sender‟ and
„receiver‟ is smallest which implies that the influence of labor poaching is expected to be
smallest. These own-type spillovers represent traditional localization economies.
The cross-diagonal effects in the bottom left quadrant capture the effects of activity
in higher productivity types on enterprises in lower productivity types. Localization
spillovers could be positive or negative depending on the magnitude of the labor poaching
effect, but we expect them to be smaller than own-type effects. The cross-diagonal effects in
the top right quadrant capture the effects of activity in lower productivity types on
enterprises in higher productivity types. Based on the above discussion, we can also expect
these effects to be smaller than own-type spillovers. Knowledge spillovers are not expected
to be the likely source of any localization economies since such spillovers are generally
associated with more sophisticated technology which higher productivity enterprises employ.
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The likely source of positive spillovers is input sharing including labor. A priori, the exact
signs are unknown. However, enterprises in ownership types lower in the hierarchy are less
likely to exert labor poaching forces on enterprises higher in the hierarchy. Therefore, we
may expect these effects to be larger than those in the bottom left quadrant.

3.3 Empirical Strategy and Estimation Issues
To examine the relationship between manufacturing activity in different ownership
types and enterprise productivity, I divide the data into three samples - state-owned, privateowned and foreign-owned. Then, using enterprise level data, I estimate an augmented
production function that includes measures of intra-industry employment within a city,
differentiated by ownership types, as explanatory variables. The estimating equation is as
follows61:
(
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time under state-owned, private-owned, and foreign-owned enterprise types respectively,

This equation is derived assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function for enterprise and taking logs of:
∏
where is output, is labor, is capital, and is a measure of intra-industry activity under each of the three
ownership types ( ) , industry ( ), and city ( ) at time ( ).
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and

is a white noise error term that captures idiosyncratic differences in enterprise

level value added.
An alternative strategy to (3.3.1) is to estimate the total factor productivity (TFP) for
each enterprise and then regress enterprise level TFP on the agglomeration measures. The
results are robust to this alternative and are provided in Appendix 3B and 3C, giving
confidence that the results are not driven by specification of the production function.

Estimation issues
In estimating own and cross-type localization spillovers, there are four estimation
issues of particular concern. First, selection bias is a likely issue in the Chinese context. The
sample years coincide with a period of rapid privatization of state-owned enterprises. There
might be concern that unproductive SOEs were disproportionately being privatized during
this period so that relatively productive enterprises remained in the state-owned category.
This selection could lead to a positive correlation between productivity of SOEs and
economic activity under the three ownership types. In order to address such concerns, I
estimate model (3.3.1) on a balanced panel of SOEs, constructed to include only those
enterprises that were state-owned in 1998 and remained state-owned throughout the entire
sample period.62
The second concern is measurement error in the key variables of interest, intraindustry employment within a city organized by ownership type. In the context of this study,
measurement error arises when employment at a multi-plant firm is allocated to a particular
The definition used to designate enterprises as state-owned include shareholding limited and other limited
types. These hybrid ownership forms emerged out of the state enterprise reform process and retain a
significant amount of state control (Huang, 2008, p.13 -19).
62
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location when in fact the employment is located across a number of different locations. The
Annual Surveys of Industrial Production collects observations at the firm level.63 In
principle, this creates ambiguity as to where a firm‟s workers are located and could therefore
complicate efforts to measure the degree of employment agglomeration in a given location
and industry. The ideal dataset instead would report establishment level data for which there
would be no ambiguity with respect to the location of a company‟s workers.64 Fortunately,
this issue turns out to be much less of a concern than might otherwise be feared.
In China, more than 95% of all firms in the entire sample are single-plant firms
(Brandt et al, 2009). Table 3.2 indicates that the number of multi-plant firms is decreasing
over time. This trend can be explained by observing that SOEs have the largest share of
multi-plant firms, as shown in Table 3.3, compared to private and foreign-owned enterprises.
Beginning in the mid-nineties, the Chinese government aggressively privatized SOEs, leading
to massive reorganization that decreased the number of SOEs and hence number of multiplant firms. Table 3.3 shows that the share of employment represented by single-plant firms
within each ownership type is lowest in SOEs. This implies that any measurement error issue
will be more pronounced for measures of economic activity for the sample of state-owned
enterprises compared to the other two ownership types.

There are two types of basic units used by statistical agencies in China. These are legal units and
establishments. Legal units conform to the definition of an organization unit in the System of National
Accounts (SNA) published by the United Nations. Establishments conform to the definition of establishments
in SNA. The National Bureau of Statistics surveys legal units in the annual surveys.
63

Lu (2008), for example, uses 1996 and 2001 establishment level data to study agglomeration patterns in
China.
64
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Robustness checks are carried out to test the sensitivity of the results to measures of
agglomeration derived from employment in single-plant firms only. An additional check is
carried out where localization measures using employment in single-plant firms and
employment in multi-plant firms are included separately as explanatory variables. The basic
patterns in the results remain qualitatively unchanged.
The third estimation issue arises because there may be industry-, city-, and timeunobservable factors that the firm observes but the econometrician does not. To address
time invariant omitted variables a full set of industry, city, and time dummies are included in
(3.3.1) as follows:

(
(

)

(

)

)
(3.3.2)

where

is a set of four digit industry dummies;

of year dummies and

is a set of city dummies; and

is a set

is white noise.

Each set of fixed effects controls for various types of unobservable variables that
could affect enterprise level productivity. Industry dummies control for industry specific
technology, skill requirements, and other industry specific common shocks. City dummies
control for location specific natural resources, infrastructure and local policies. For example,
several cities and parts of cities in China are designated as Special Economic Zones and
other special economic areas such as Economic and Technological Development Area, HiTechnology Development Areas, and Export Processing Zones (Wang and Wei, 2008).
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These areas were primarily set up to encourage interactions between foreign and domestic
firms in the hopes of realization of positive externalities. Without city level controls or city
dummies, effects of such policies on productivity would be incorrectly attributed to the
localization variables. City dummies further absorb any aggregate employment or
urbanization effect. Time dummies control for macroeconomic shocks such as inflation, the
Asian financial crisis, accession of China to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and
other national shocks.
Finally, after controlling for industry, city, and time specific unobservable variables it
is still possible that time varying unobservables remain which are correlated with the error
term. For example, policies set at the level of the central government that are implemented
at different times at the city level will not be picked up by city fixed effects alone. In
particular, privatization of state-owned enterprises is carried out at the level of the city
government and the pace and time of implementation varies across cities and time.
Controlling for city-time effects could also potentially capture the influence of unobservable
variables that might be correlated with the error term but that might have drawn in talented
entrepreneurs to a city. To address such concerns, city by year fixed effects replace city and
year fixed effects in (3.3.2).
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)
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)
(3.3.3)
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where

is a set of city by year dummies;

is a set of four digit industry dummies and

is white noise. This specification is the most demanding of the data and results from
this model form the basis of discussion in Section 5.

3.4 Data and Variables
3.4.1 Data Description
Data used in this study are drawn from Annual Surveys of Industrial Production
conducted by the Chinese government‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The dataset
includes a panel of all non-state owned firms whose annual sales exceed 5 million yuan
(referred to as “above-scale” industrial firms) and all state-owned enterprises during 19982006.65,66 The dataset contains detailed information on about hundred variables, including
enterprise identification code, four-digit industry code, six-digit geographic administrative
code, ownership type, gross industrial output value, value added, export value, total
employment, capital stock, and intermediate inputs.
The NBS classifies enterprises into 23 detailed ownership categories. Each enterprise
is assigned a registration code at time of establishment designating its ownership type. These
codes have been grouped into three broad categories for purposes of the study.67 The
groupings were motivated by the well documented hierarchy in terms of average productivity
The NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese
indigenous privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section
of China Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in
the China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset.
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5 million yuan amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.

State-owned enterprises (SOE): 110, 141, 143, 151, 159, 160; Private-owned enterprises (POE): 120, 130,
142, 149, 171, 172, 173, 174, 190; Enterprises from ethnically Chinese economies of Hong Kong, Macao, and
Taiwan (ECE): 210, 220, 230, 240; Enterprises from all other countries (non-ECE): 310, 320, 330, 340;
Foreign-owned enterprises (FOE): ECE and non-ECE.
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where foreign-owned enterprises are more productive than private-owned enterprises and
who are in turn more productive than state-owned enterprises.
Average characteristics by ownership type
To compare characteristics between enterprises in the three ownership types,
especially to see if the productivity hierarchy between ownership types is evident in the data,
Table 3.4 presents results from running a simple descriptive regression. Six outcome
variables for an enterprise ,

- output, exporting value, labor productivity (value added

per worker), new product output value per worker, wage, and capital per worker - are
regressed on ownership (

), two-digit industry ( ), and province ( )

dummies for each year in the sample, 1998 - 2006.

( )

(3.4.1)

Results indicate that on average, enterprises differ markedly by ownership type.
FOEs are on average larger (in terms of gross output value), export more, are more
productive, innovative, pay higher wages, and use more capital per worker compared to their
domestic counterparts. Within the domestic-owned enterprises, POEs are on average more
productive than SOEs providing evidence for the productivity hierarchy found in previous
studies. For example, in 1998, FOEs were 259% and 30% more productive and paid 79%
and 45% higher wages per worker compared to SOEs and POEs respectively. POEs were
177% more productive and paid 23% higher wages per worker compared to SOEs.68 On

The percentage difference in any of the outcome variables between any two ownership types can be
(
( )
)-.
calculated from as ,
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average, the private-owned were also larger and more innovative than state-owned
enterprises.
SOEs are consistently more capital intensive compared to POEs. This is consistent
with evidence of the state-sector becoming concentrated in large, capital-intensive firms as
the reform process continues (Naughton, 2007, p. 301 – 304). The higher wage trend at
POEs relative to SOEs is visible except for the last three years in the sample. This is
suggestive of SOEs becoming more market oriented towards the end of the sample period.
In general, we observe a declining trend in the differences between enterprises in the three
broad ownership types.

3.4.2 Key Variables
Productivity
Under the augmented production function approach real firm value added is regressed on
labor, real capital, and localization measures. The dataset provides information on nominal
value added that is converted to real terms using the Brandt-Rawski two-digit industry
output deflators (Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang, 2005).69
Under the alternative specification, enterprise level productivity is regressed on
measures of nearby own-industry activity. Productivity is measured using a semi-parametric
method proposed by Olley and Pakes (1996).70 Details on this method are provided in
Appendix 3A.
Localization economies
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The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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Carried out using the Stata module opreg (Yasar, Raciborski, Poi, 2008).

55

∑

where

(3.4.2.1)

is total employment summed over all enterprises

industry and city , at time as enterprise

in the same

but excluding , for each ownership type

(

= SOE, POE, FOE).
Information on location of an enterprise is crucial for construction of the
localization variables. The dataset provides information on the six digit county codes where
the first two digits represent the province, the second two the city, and finally the last two
digits designate the county. China‟s administrative boundaries change often so that county
codes, the most disaggregated level of geography, also change over the sample period.71 To
ensure consistency over time, county codes for all enterprises were matched and recoded
against one benchmark system. The benchmark system adopted was the set of 2873 county
codes used in the 2000 China County Population Census Data.72
In addition to ownership and location information, we need to distinguish
enterprises by industry. The dataset provides information on four-digit manufacturing
industries according to the Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC) system. CIC codes were
readjusted and renumbered in 2003.73 Consequently, industry codes were adjusted for years
prior to 2003 ensuring that codes are comparable across the sample period.
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See Lu and Tao (2009) for a discussion about this issue.

The 2000 China County Population Census Data was purchased from the China Data Center at the
University of Michigan.
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Prior to 2003, NBS followed GB/T 4754 - 1994 industry classification system and 2003 onwards GB/T 4754
- 2002 was adopted. Two changes were made in the 2 digit divisions: (i) the 1994 division 39 (“Arms and
Ammunition Manufacturing”) was added to 2002 division 36 (“Special Equipment Manufacturing”). Then the
remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly i.e. 1994 division 40 corresponds to 2002 division
39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, 1994 division 42 corresponds to 2002 division 41, and
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3.5 Results
In Tables 3.5 – 3.11, separate panels present the results for each sample.74 Two
columns are reported for each sample. The first column presents results from model (3.3.2)
which includes a full set of four-digit industry, city, and year dummies. The second column
presents results from model (3.3.3) which includes four-digit industry and city by year
dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the four-digit industry level. I focus on results in
column (2) for each sample in the discussion below, as these are the most demanding of the
data.

3.5.1 Localization Spillovers by Ownership Type
Table 3.5 presents the main results. The key pattern observed is that localization
spillovers attenuate as enterprises become more dissimilar. For each sample, localization
spillovers are positive and largest from nearby own-type activity, except for the sample of
state-owned enterprises, which is discussed shortly. For the sample of state-owned
enterprises, we observe that a doubling of employment in nearby own-type activity increases
productivity by 1.10%; for the sample of private and foreign-owned enterprises the
magnitude of the own-type effect is 1.90% and 1.40% respectively. To gain perspective on
the magnitude of these positive spillover effects, I compare them to localization spillovers
found in the U.S. by Henderson (2003), who studies the impact of own-industry activity on

1994 division 43 corresponds to 2002 division 42 (ii) 2002 division 43 (“Waste Resources and Old Material
Recycling and Processing”) was added which was not part of manufacturing in the previous period.
All results exclude Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” since close to 100% of the enterprises
operating in this industry is state-owned.
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establishment level productivity. Henderson‟s (2003) estimates of the elasticities of ownindustry activity are in the range of 0.012 to 0.021.75 The elasticities of own-type intraindustry activity fall within this range and attest to the presence of traditional localization
economies typically found in the agglomeration literature.
As hypothesized earlier, we find that cross-type spillovers are smaller compared to
own-type spillovers. Foreign presence confers spillovers of much smaller magnitude on both
POEs and SOEs relative to own-type spillovers for each sample. The coefficient on the
foreign localization variable is similar in magnitude for both the state-owned and privateowned samples although it fails to attain significance at conventional levels for the former.
For the state-owned sample, the presence of private-owned enterprises offers double
the productivity boost of enterprises in its own type. This is contrary to the idea of
attenuation as enterprises become dissimilar in their technology levels. We expect own-type
spillovers to be largest and POEs to exert labor poaching forces on SOEs. This is suggestive
of the role of absorptive capacity at work. Since the productivity distance between stateowned and private-owned enterprises is smaller relative to the distance between state-owned
and foreign-owned enterprises, SOEs are hypothesized to better absorb spillovers
originating from POEs. Still, the magnitude of the spillover is puzzling.
There is evidence showing that SOEs often outsource their production activities to
POEs, particularly collective-owned enterprises (Jefferson and Rawski, 1999), which may
explain the significantly large positive effect from POEs.76 Although, POEs may lure away

Henderson (2003) measures nearby activity as the number of own industry plants in a U.S. county for
machinery and high tech industries.
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Collective owned-enterprises (COEs) are factories that are nominally owned by the workers in the enterprise
but controlled by local governments (Banister, 2005).
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skilled workers, SOEs are able to tap into the skilled labor pool via outsourcing
arrangements.
To explore this idea further, I estimate model (3.3.3) for the sample of SOEs only,
excluding collective-owned enterprises from the measure of localization economies in the
private-owned type. The results are displayed in Table 3.6. Column (1) includes intraindustry employment within a city at POEs excluding employment at COEs; column (2)
includes an additional measure of intra-industry employment within a city at COEs as a
separate explanatory variable. Results indicate that even after removing COEs from the
measure of localization represented by the private-owned type, POEs confer strong positive
spillovers on SOEs that are larger than own-type localization spillovers.
Cross-type spillovers, originating from lower to higher productivity enterprises, are
also smaller compared to own-type spillovers. As noted earlier, we expect these effects to be
smaller than own-type spillovers and more likely larger than spillovers from higher to lower
productivity enterprises due to smaller likelihood of negative labor poaching forces. Activity
in SOEs appears to have no effect on the productivity of private and foreign-owned
enterprises. SOEs rank lowest in terms of productivity and workers tend to be older, less
educated, have less foreign work experience, and get lower wages in comparison to the
domestic private sector (Hale and Long, 2008). Therefore, it is reasonable to find that SOEs
do not confer localization spillovers to their neighbors. Activity in POEs confers strong,
positive spillovers on both SOEs and FOEs. The spillover effect on FOEs is larger than
spillovers in the reverse direction.
Results on cross-type spillovers, both from foreign to domestic enterprises and from
domestic to foreign enterprises, together support the hypothesis that labor poaching
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diminishes the value of localization spillovers. In the absence of labor poaching, we would
expect all cross-type spillovers to be of similar magnitudes.
One particular result that stands out is the impact of employment at private-owned
enterprises. Results in Tables 3.5 – 3.11 indicate that POEs exert positive spillovers on
enterprises under all ownership types. POEs are the fastest growing segment in China in
terms of employment (see Figure 1) despite facing several financial and regulatory policy
biases.77 Private ownership is an essential ingredient in moving towards a market oriented
economy. Positive spillovers from POEs underline their importance in the transition of the
Chinese economy towards a market-oriented environment.

3.5.2 Differences by Source of Foreign Investment
To further tease out the nuances in cross-type spillovers, Table 3.7 divides foreignowned enterprises into enterprises originating from ethnically Chinese economies of Hong
Kong, Macao, and Taiwan (ECEs) and enterprises from all other countries but dominated by
the U.S., European Union and Japan (non-ECEs).78 This further stratification of ownership
types allows us to consider the role of ethnic business networks facilitating localization
spillovers.
ECEs and non-ECEs have different motivations for locating in China. Investors
from ethnically Chinese economies primarily engage in export-oriented FDI, locating in
China to tap into the large and cheap source of labor to carry out production for export

See Huang (2008) who argues that a political pecking order exists in China where state-owned firms have
been favored by the Chinese government over firms in the domestic private-owned sector.
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Between 1979-1999, the US, EU, and Japan together accounted for half of the FDI originating from nonethnically Chinese economies (Zhang, 2005).
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markets. On the other hand, investors from non-ethnically Chinese economies primarily
engage in market-oriented FDI, locating in China to access the large domestic markets
(Zhang, 2005). Foreign enterprises producing for the domestic market are more likely to
source intermediate inputs from other domestic enterprises strengthening the opportunity
for positive spillovers. Export-oriented foreign enterprises are more likely to source
intermediate inputs from the parent company restricting the opportunity for interactions
with domestic enterprises. Therefore, non-ECEs producing for the domestic market are
more likely to interact with domestic enterprises compared to ECEs.
Foreign-owned and domestic-owned enterprises also have different cultural profiles
that can impact the absorptive capacity of an enterprise.79 Within the FOEs operating in
China, there are distinct cultural differences between ECEs and non-ECEs relative to the
host country. ECEs share cultural and linguistic ties with China, as well as family and
business ties. Non-ECEs are primarily from OECD countries who do not share cultural or
language similarities with China. Shared culture can facilitate communication and
transactions with local businesses. From a domestic enterprise‟s perspective it may be „easier‟
to learn from ECEs compared to non-ECEs due to cultural similarities.
The general patterns observed in Table 3.5 still persist. Own-type spillovers are the
largest while cross-type spillovers are much smaller with spillovers from foreign to domestic
enterprises being smaller than those in the reverse direction. Additionally, we observe that
spillovers from foreign enterprises to POEs are found to originate from non-ECEs only.
Since ECEs primarily engage in export processing activities, domestic-owned enterprises

I refer to cultural differences as encompassing differences in language and ethnicity in particular although it
could also include culture in the sense of Saxenian (1996). However, corporate culture in the Saxenian sense is
difficult to measure, so I focus on observable differences in enterprises by their country of origin.
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may have fewer opportunities to interact with them as explained above. In contrast, the
market orientation of non-ECE investment increases the likelihood of interaction with
domestic enterprises. There is some evidence of negative spillovers from non-ECEs to
SOEs, although lacking statistical significance under the preferred specification in column 2.
The novel result revealed in this table is that ECEs and non-ECEs virtually have no
impact on each other. This is particularly surprising since the respective own-type spillovers
are positive, statistically significant, and of similar magnitude. Because these regressions
include controls for industries, cities, and time we cannot attribute the results to any intercity or inter-industry differences. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper to explain the
apparent lack of interaction between enterprises in these two foreign ownership types, I
offer a few preliminary suggestions. Ethnic business networks might be a strong candidate in
explaining why ECEs appear to interact only with other ECEs. Managers and workers in
ECEs share a common language and close cultural ties that would facilitate economic
transactions, in addition to being engaged in processing export activities.
However, the absence of spillovers from non-ECEs to ECEs cannot be attributed to
cultural differences alone since non-ECEs experience positive spillovers from POEs despite
the absence of common culture or language. Zero spillovers in the opposite direction, ECEs
to non-ECEs, might be a facet of the export driven orientation of ECE investment.
Availability of FDI data by country of origin for non-ECEs would shed further light on this
result. For example, Todo, Zhang, Zhou (2009), using detailed data from a large high
technology park in Beijing, find that Japanese MNCs do not have any productivity
improving spillovers on domestic Chinese firms. The authors attribute this to the small size
of the highly educated and the overseas educated labor employed by Japanese MNCs.
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3.5.3 Robustness Checks
3.5.3.1 Single-Plant Firms Only
To address concerns about measurement error in the localization variables, I
reconstruct the localization variables to include employment in single-plant firms only. I also
exclude multi-plant firms from each sample before re-estimating model (3.3.2). The results
are displayed in Tables 3.8 – 3.11. Table 3.8 includes measures of localization using
employment in single-plant firms only. Table 3.9 further divides foreign-owned enterprises
into ECEs and non-ECEs. Tables 3.10 and 3.11 mirror Tables 3.8 and 3.9 respectively,
except that they also include localization measures using employment in multi-plant firms
only as separate explanatory variables in addition to measures of localization using
employment in single-plant firms only. All four tables display results for the augmented
production function approach. Column (1) presents results from model (3.3.2) which
includes a full set of four-digit industry, city, and year dummies. Column (2) presents results
from model (3.3.3) which includes four-digit industry and city by year dummies. I focus on
results in column (2) for each sample in the discussion below.
In general, the results attest to the robustness of own-type spillovers being larger
than cross-type localization spillovers. The results also attest to the persistent positive
spillovers from POEs to enterprises in all other ownership types. The absence of spillovers
between ECEs and non-ECEs remain. However, I find no statistically significant cross-type
spillovers from foreign-owned to domestic-owned enterprises except in Table 3.11, where
negative spillovers from non-ECEs to SOEs become statistically significant. Positive
productivity spillovers from SOEs to foreign enterprises also gain statistical significance in
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Tables 3.8 – 3.11. After separating foreign enterprises into ECEs and non-ECEs, this effect
is visible for the sample of non-ECEs only. This is surprising since non-ECEs are the most
technologically superior and productive group while SOEs rank the lowest. Lower
productivity is posited to be associated with lower skilled workers and inferior technology,
so the labor pooling and knowledge spillover channels are unlikely to explain this result. The
likely candidate would be input sharing.

3.5.3.2 Controlling for Output Market Competition
Previous studies, such as Aitken and Harrison (1999), find that foreign presence is
negatively correlated with domestic-owned enterprise productivity due to a negative market
stealing effect. This possibility may raise concerns that the smaller spillovers to domesticowned enterprises from foreign-owned enterprises are being driven by output market
competition instead of labor poaching as hypothesized in this study. This section considers
the possibility that negative output market competition is driving the observed pattern of
results by controlling for local competition.
I re-estimate model (3.3.3) including proxies for local competition within an
industry-city space. The results are reported in Table 3.12. Competition is measured as the
total number of firms in an industry within a city, differentiated by ownership types. Stateowned enterprises are counted as a single enterprise since there is a single owner, the
Chinese government. The results indicate that even after controlling for local competition
the basic patterns observed in Table 3.5 still persist. Competition from POEs is found to
have a positive impact on enterprise level productivity controlling for overall scale of activity
in an industry-city space. This is consistent with existing evidence (Glaeser, Kallal,
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Scheinkman, Shleifer, 1992; Rosenthal and Strange, 2003) that finds local competition to
enhance growth. Competition from FOEs only impacts productivity of FOEs positively
while the effect is statistically insignificant for domestic-owned enterprises.

3.5.4. Estimated Magnitude of Labor Poaching
Using estimates of own and cross-type spillovers, I conduct a simple exercise to offer
indirect evidence for the size of the labor poaching effect. I have argued that own-type
spillovers primarily reflect traditional localization spillovers. Cross-type spillovers,
particularly those from foreign to domestic-owned enterprises, are weakened by labor
poaching forces. We can difference own and cross-type spillovers to arrive at a range of
estimates for the negative labor poaching effect. The coefficients of interest are those
spillovers originating from high to low productivity enterprises in Table 3.5, notably
spillovers from foreign to domestic-owned enterprises. Differencing yields elasticities of 0.011 and -0.017 respectively.80 Implicitly, it is assumed that the strength of localization
spillovers would be similar in the absence of differences between firms by ownership types.
This exercise suggests that the labor poaching effects can be as large as own-type spillovers.
Chinese policy makers interested in attracting FDI should be cautioned by the potential for
labor poaching to diminish desired spillovers from foreign multinational companies.

3.6. Conclusions
The empirical agglomeration literature finds robust evidence of benefits arising from
the proximity to nearby own-industry activity. However, these benefits have previously not
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(
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been considered to vary along the ownership dimension of an enterprise, particularly in the
context of a transition economy. Meanwhile, the literature on foreign direct investment has
paid particular attention to benefits arising to domestic firms from the proximity to foreign
firms. However, spillovers in the reverse direction are less well examined. This paper
addresses these gaps.
Using data on manufacturing enterprises operating in China during 1998-2006, this
study estimates and offers explanations as to why localization spillovers might vary by
ownership type of an enterprise. Exploiting a well-established productivity hierarchy in
China, where foreign-owned enterprises are more productive compared to private-owned
enterprises who are in turn more productive than state-owned enterprises, I find evidence of
attenuation of localization spillovers as enterprises become more dissimilar in their
productivity levels. In particular, the pattern of results is consistent with conflicting forces of
positive agglomeration economies and negative labor poaching at work in the presence of
foreign multinational companies.
In addition, I find evidence of positive localization spillovers from private-owned
enterprises to enterprises in all other ownership types. This finding underscores the
important role of indigenous private enterprises in the Chinese economy and points towards
the possibility of larger productivity spillovers in the absence of domestic policy biases
against domestic private-owned enterprises.
Finally, I find that within the foreign-owned sector, own-industry activity in
enterprises originating from ethnically Chinese economies within a city has virtually no
impact on the productivity of enterprises originating primarily from OECD countries and
vice versa. This result points to the role of ethnic business networks facilitating localization
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spillovers and warrants further research to understand interactions among multinational
corporations.
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________________________________________________________________________

4. Evolving Property Rights and Shifting Organization
Forms: Evidence From Joint-Venture Buyouts Following
China’s WTO Accession
______________________________________________________
4.1

Introduction
A remarkable flowering of research has shed light on the rapidly changing

international organization of production. As reviewed by Helpman (2006), this research has
greatly expanded our understanding of why firms outsource, whether they source
intermediate inputs domestically or from a foreign trading partner, and whether they choose
to procure the inputs through arm‟s length transactions or to produce the components
within the firm‟s boundaries. With extensive reliance on foreign-funded enterprises in its
export sector and detailed trade data, China has proved to be a useful testing ground for
some of these new theories and observations. Feenstra and Hanson (2005) use Chinese
trade data to test hypotheses from the property rights theory against observed propensities
to process inputs under alternative arrangements of ownership and control over imported
inputs. Fernandes and Tang (2010) extend this work by introducing firm heterogeneity as an
additional determinant of vertical integration in export processing.
We also test the ability of incomplete contracts and property rights theory to aid our
understanding of firm‟s organizational choices in China. Rather than focus on vertical
integration and export processing, however, we study the incentive problems guiding
multinational firms‟ organizational choices when engaged in horizontal FDI. Our
presumption is that substantial changes to Chinese law and policy in 1999 and China‟s 2001
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accession to the World Trade Organization enhanced the ability of foreign firm to produce
and sell in China as wholly owned subsidiaries rather than as joint ventures. We adapt the
Feenstra-Hanson (2005) property rights model to predict how the characteristics of an
ongoing equity joint venture determine the surplus value derived from alternative
organizational form. The theory predicts that higher productivity and higher value added,
but a lower domestic sales share, increase the probability that a joint venture will become a
wholly foreign owned subsidiary rather than remain an EJV. The theory also predicts that
enterprises with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales share are more
likely to be acquired by their Chinese partners rather than remain an EJV.
We test these theoretical predictions using newly created enterprise-level panel data
on equity joint ventures and changes in registration type after 2000. We estimate a
multinomial logit model of organization choice, with our choice of regressors closely
matched to the theory. Our empirical results provide strong support for the property rights
model and for the view that changes in Chinese policies have led to predictable changes in
multinational organizational strategies.

4.2. Chinese Regulation and the Changing Integration Strategy of Foreign Firms in
China
Deng Xiaoping‟s famous Southern Tour of January 1992 ushered in large flows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) to mainland China. Even though wholly owned foreign
enterprises (WFOEs) were permitted outside of Special Economic Zones by the 1986 Law
on Wholly Foreign-Owned Enterprises, most of the foreign investment entering China
during the 1990s took the form of Sino-foreign joint ventures (SFJVs) (Cheung, 2007). As
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shown by Figure 4.1(a), funds entering China for joint ventures exceeded funds entering for
wholly owned operations until at least 1998 (using contracted FDI) and, as shown in Figure
4.1(b), probably until 1999 (using actually utilized FDI). The period from Deng‟s tour until
1997 was one of substantial FDI liberalization, with substantial preferences given for foreign
firms to engage in joint ventures with indigenous enterprises. While Huang (2003) focuses
on why international production integration with China took the form of FDI rather than
contractual arrangements common in the take-off phase of other East Asian economies, it is
equally noteworthy that this FDI took the form of joint ventures rather than WFOEs.
Policies of the central and provincial governments surely are part of the explanation
for the dominance of joint ventures during the 1990s. Although WFOEs were permitted in
many sectors and offered similar incentives, foreign firms report barriers to establishing
wholly owned subsidiaries ranging from substantial delays in approval to vigorous
suggestions for local partners.81 Wholly owned enterprises were not permitted in
“strategically important” infrastructure, such as nuclear power plants, but they were also
essentially barred from projects in aerospace, automobiles, chemicals, defense, medical
institutions, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, printing and publications, shipping, satellite
communications, soft drinks, and tourism.82 On the other hand, SFJVs enjoyed access to
special economic and development zones, preferential tax treatment, and access to sectors
where WFOEs were not permitted. Yan and Warner (2002) emphasize the differences by
concluding that “at the inception of economic reforms the Chinese government intentionally
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Some of the restricted sectors required Chinese partners within SFJVs to hold a majority share.
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See Foreign Investment Administration (1998).
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packaged EJVs with preferential privileges, while granting WFOEs virtually nothing but
regulations (p.141).
In addition to policies that favored joint ventures, foreign investors may have
preferred them to wholly owned subsidiaries for reasons specific to Chinese governance and
market development.83 First, the Chinese government at that time was ambivalent toward
the rule of law, offering seeing the law as an instrument of the state. Regulatory and
unwritten policy changes, for instance, offer trumped laws in the administration of foreign
claims. A Chinese partner could be helpful in understanding and anticipating these changes.
Secondly, the Chinese state lacked institutional capacity, due to fragmentation, overlapping
jurisdiction, lack of cooperation, and corruption. Again, a Chinese partner could be helpful
solving local regulatory and procurement problems. Finally, exchange in China is anchored
by informal social ties. Relational contracting in Chinese societies focuses on guanxi to the
extent that, according to Clarke et al (2008, p. 407), “discussion of guanxi links not only
relations among entrepreneurs but also relations between entrepreneurs and government
officials.”84 Many companies find that a local partner helps nurture local customers, gain
access to marketing and distribution networks as well as government connections (Sutter,
2000).
Indigenous firms also may have preferred a foreign partner to going it alone. As
forcefully argued by Haggard and Huang (2008), indigenous private entrepreneurs in the
1990s were largely credit constrained and often entered into joint venture agreements to gain
access to capital and to circumvent substantial restrictions imposed on the development of
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See Wang (2001, ch. 3) for an overview of the legal framework for FDI.
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See Bian (1994) for a definition and discussion of guanxi, or interpersonal relationships, in China.
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the private sector but not on foreign investors. In this view, Chinese policy “followed the
unusual course of favoring foreign private investors over domestic ones (p. 363).”
By the late nineties policies that influenced the organizational form chosen by both
foreign and indigenous investors seem to have changed. By 2000, the majority of inward
FDI took the form of wholly foreign-owned investment (see Figure 4.1(b))85. Locating the
exact source of this dramatic take-off in WFOEs is difficult and is probably attributable to a
convergence of domestic policy changes. First, in 1999, the Chinese Constitution was
amended to sanction a larger role for nonpublic sector enterprises and to recognize the
legitimacy of interest and dividend income. Secondly, in the same year a new, unified
Contract Law was promulgated granting natural individuals, not just legal persons, the ability
to enter into legally enforceable contracts and giving oral contracts a stronger legal footing.
According to Clarke et al (2008, p. 406), this “principle of freedom of contract signals a
definitive move away from the planned economy.” They also report that court records from
Nanjing from 1999 to 2001 show “private enterprises entering into legally enforceable
contracts and enjoying recourse to the courts – features of contract regime that were absent
through the early 1990s (p. 406).”
Perhaps as importantly, in 1999 China and the United State reached a bilateral
agreement clearing the way for China‟s accession to the WTO in 2001. WTO entry
improved the rule of law and the property rights of foreign investors in many ways. Perhaps
most importantly, WTO accession eliminated many restrictions placed on WFOEs that were
not also placed on other forms of investments. Perhaps most notable in this regard are the

85 Data

on utilized FDI inflow is unavailable prior to 1997. Figure 1(b) plots contracted FDI inflows by
registration type between 1992 and 1999 illustrating the declining trend in joint ventures, the increasing trend in
wholly foreign owned by 1999 and the spike in inflows in 1993.
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elimination of export requirements for WFOEs and the granting of rights to engage in
distribution and after-sales service. Both of these changes expand local market access for
these foreign owned firms. WTO accession also brings external commitment to China‟s
evolving property rights, as emphasized by Tang and Wei (2009). Tang and Wei quote a
recent U.S. Government Accounting Office report as noting that in its accession
negotiations, China has “made a substantial number of important, specific commitments in
the rule-of-law-related areas of transparency, judicial review, uniform enforcement of legal
measures, and nondiscrimination in its commercial policy.”86
Despite amendment to its Constitution and accession to the WTO, contract
enforcement in China is far from certain. Despite recent developments, according to Clarke
et al, “Contract Law and the courts still play a minor role in underpinning exchange
agreements.” They do, however, cite new evidence that despite the role of social networks,
formal, written contracts have become the norm in business agreements. Of particular note,
a World Bank (2001) study finds that written contracts were used for 90% of contracts with
clients and 82% with suppliers. Nevertheless, Clarke et al conclude that “the Chinese legal
system does not provide a secure system of property rights (p. 399).
What emerges from a review of the evolving legal basis for contractual enforcement
of property rights is that incomplete contracts remain a significant feature of investing in
China. However, substantial changes to domestic laws culminating in amendment of the
Chinese constitution and completion of bilateral agreements for WTO accession in 1999
fundamentally altered the Chinese business landscape. The dramatic take-off of WFOEs as
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Tang and Wei (2009) citing GAO-05-53-2004.
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an investment vehicle observed in the aggregate FDI data, in this light, is a response by
foreign investors to changes in the benefits of this organization form over the SFJV.
Testing the importance of incomplete contracts and changes in property rights to the
organization choices of multinational firms is difficult. We do not observe projects prior to
inception, often lack detailed information on parents, and do not know the set of options
actually considered by the firm. We propose an alternative approach, based on observations
of equity joint ventures established prior to the substantial reforms of 1999. These ongoing
enterprises experienced the same liberalization as did potential investors, permitting changes
in organization form that, if consideration of incomplete contracts and property rights
theory is useful, should occurs in ways that we can predict. Such a test adds to a still small,
but growing, body of research that seeks empirical evidence on the role of formal and
informal institutions in the international organization of production. We turn now to a
theoretical model of organizational choice in the presence of imperfect contracts.

4.3 A Property Rights Model of Organizational Form in China
We consider the options facing the foreign and domestic partners of an equity joint
venture operating in China. Our framework is based on the Feenstra and Hanson (2005)
model (hereafter the FH model), which applies the Grossman-Hart-Moore property rights
theory to export-processing firms in China.87 The FH model centers on the use of control
rights to ameliorate holdup problems created by incomplete contracts. Our adaptation
retains their original emphasis on partners‟ responses to imperfect contracts but it shifts the
focus away from export processing and toward the use of advanced technology in China by
The model draws on foundation provided by Hart (1995), Hart and Moore (1990) and Grossman and Hart
(1986).
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firms serving local markets. The FH framework is well suited to our purpose as it permits
easily interpretable expressions for the project‟s surplus value under alternative
organizational forms and to predict how these relationships evolve as a consequence of
strengthened property rights.

4.3.1. Production and Effort
We consider the interaction of a foreign partner, f, and a domestic Chinese partner, s,
who join to produce a good in China using foreign technology, local production labor, and
local marketing services. Surplus from the project is divided by ex-post Nash bargaining.
The project requires the application of foreign technology (proprietary designs, processes, or
customized equipment) to local labor, with output marketed to local Chinese customers.
Foreign technology is contributed by the foreign partner. Local production may be
controlled by either the foreign or the Chinese partner while domestic marketing services
must be performed by the Chinese partner. Timing is standard: in period 0 the partners
decide who will own the firm and who will control production; in period 1 the partners
simultaneously make effort investments; and in period 2 the partners carry out production
and final sales.
Although our model is derived from Feenstra and Hanson (2005), we shape it to
reflect the issues central to a foreign investor‟s choice of organizational structure. While
Chinese law assigns firm control and residual property rights in proportion to partner‟s
equity shares, in practice, equity shares are not a guide to ownership and control.88 Equity
shares are often based on non-market valuations and, in any case, do not reflect the outside
See the extensive interviews with joint venture partners in Wang (2001) and the extensive descriptions in
Huang (2003, 2008).
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options facing each partner and, hence, bargaining power within the partnership.89 We
assume that when the partners choose an organization form for their activities, they choose
the partner who will have rights to residual profits and the partner who will control
production. If ownership and control are split, we assume that both partners make equity
investments and the organization is registered as a joint venture. If ownership and control
reside with a single partner, only one partner makes an equity investment and the
organization is registered as a wholly-owned foreign enterprise or a wholly-owned domestic
enterprise. Organizational form is chosen to maximize the surplus from the project, given
effort levels by each partner when surplus is divided through Nash bargaining.90
A second deviation from the FH model structure is that we shift focus away from
input processing and input search effort and toward the use of advanced technology and the
adaptation of local production processes to that technology. For example, in a joint venture
created to produce industrial boilers, the foreign partner may exert effort adapting
proprietary boiler specifications for local customers while the Chinese partner adapts local
production processes to the advanced designs. Greater effort by each partner increases the
surplus from the project.
Third, we deviate from FH by focusing our attention on the domestic Chinese
market rather than on export sales, although we control for the export intensity of the firm
in our empirical work. While export sales remain an important source of revenue for SFJVs,

Sutter (2000) notes that equity stake does not necessarily equal managerial control, but rather that control
rests in the JV contract and the choice of partner. She notes that with properly structured contracts, a foreign
firm can get as much managerial control in an EJV as they get in a WFOE (p15-16.)
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Although SFJVs may have state-affiliated Chinese partners, Haggard and Huang (2008) argue that these firms
are private, not state, firms. This view is reflected in our assumption that surplus division occurs within the
partnership.
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local sales are as important as export sales for investors outside East Asia and in certain
sectors. For example, among U.S. manufacturing majority-owned non-bank affiliates in
China, 67.4% of sales in 2005 were to the local market, and local sales accounted for more
than 85% of total sales in food, chemicals, and transport equipment. Japanese majorityowned affiliates, which are more deeply engaged in export-platform FDI in China than are
U.S. multinationals, made 53.6% of their total sales in 2005 to the local Chinese market.91
Consistently, local market barriers for wholly foreign firms and implicit preferences for
domestic firms by state-affiliated customers are mentioned in the business literature as a
factor tilting foreign investors toward a joint venture as a means of entry into the Chinese
market during the 1990s. For example, Karen Sutter, director of Business Advisory Services
at the US-China Business Council, notes that by 2000 WFOEs had emerged as a popular
investment form, yet she still advises foreign investors that “An EJV offers several potential
benefits, including the use of the local partner‟s marketing and distribution network and the
ability to offer after-sales services. An EJV can also benefit from any government
connections the local partner may have.” Our model reflects the advantages of marketing
through a local partner by positing that the Chinese partner acts as marketing representative
for the firm in the local market, a modeling decision based on pre-WTO-accession
We assume that domestic sales revenue is given by B(1  e1  e2 ), where e1 is effort
exerted by the foreign partner adapting technology to the local market and e2 is effort
exerted by either party adapting production to the foreign designs or specifications. These
efforts may be seen as raising quality and hence produce price. We restrict
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Greaney and Li (2009) provide sales shares for both U.S. and Japanese majority-owned non-bank affiliates.
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. Production costs for achieving the foreign quality
level are also influenced by production managers‟ effort and are given by A(1  e2 ).
Marketing is done by the Chinese partner and marketing costs are reduced when the local
partner exerts effort, e3 , to use its local connections: PM (1  e3 ) . These connections can be
particularly valuable for foreign firms seeking domestic contracts, as noted repeatedly by the
business partners and government officials interviewed by Wang (2001) and by Sutter (2000,
p.15), who states “the absence of a Chinese partner able to make the right connections can
make government relations works difficult.”
Given these forms for revenues and costs, profits from the joint venture are given by

B(1  e1   e2 )  A(1  e2 )  PM (1  e3 )  0,

(4.3.1.1)

where additional sales raise profits so that B  A  PM  0 . As in FH, we have introduced a
link between sales revenue and production costs, with the production manager‟s effort
influencing both. This joint production reflects the assumption that it is difficult to fully
compensate the production partner for his contribution to profits.
Period 1 effort investments impose a cost on those who make them. Let  C  (0,1)
indicate whether the foreign partner,  C  0, or the Chinese partner controls production.
Retaining the simple functional forms used by FH, the cost of supplying effort to the foreign
partner is C f [e1 ,(1   C )e2 ]  ( f / 2)(e12  (1   C )e22 ), while the cost of supplying effort to
the Chinese partner is Cs [C e2 , e3 ]  ( s / 2)( C e22  e32 ) . The parameter,  j , captures the
disutility of effort to party j. Given the extra costs associated with managing international
activities, we assume  f   s  0 .
Total surplus from the project is profits net of investment costs:
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W    C f [e1 ,(1  C )e2 ]  Cs [C e2 , e3 ],

(4.3.1.2)

where  is given by (4.3.1.1). Optimal effort levels maximize total surplus. If perfect
contracts were possible, optimal effort levels would be e1*  B /  f ; e2*  ( A   B) /  s ; and
e3*  PM /  s . Optimal assignment of production control to the Chinese partner results from

our assumption that the disutility of effort is higher for the foreign partner than for the
domestic partner.
Optimal efforts will not, in general, be made because contract imperfections lead the
parties to Nash bargain over division of the surplus. Effort levels depend on organizational
form, which defines residual property rights, and the outside options available to each
partner in the event that bargaining breaks down. Letting  0  (0,1) indicate ownership,
with  0  0 signifying foreign ownership and  0  1 signifying Chinese ownership, imperfect
contracts imply that total surplus depends on organizational form, W ( 0 ,  C ) . We turn now
to define each partner‟s outside options and the marginal investment incentives for effort
under each ownership and control arrangement.

4.3.2. Marginal Investment Incentives
To solve for the individually optimal effort levels under each organizational form, we
need to specify threat-point payoffs. We make three assumptions, closely following Feenstra
and Hanson (2005). The first two assumptions are standard in the property-rights approach,
although we adapt them to the Chinese context. The third assumption is drawn from the
FH approach and it captures the effort incentive for the Chinese partner provided by control
of production. We also add a fourth assumption that results in the elimination from one
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organization form, a Chinese-owned firm in which production is controlled by a foreign
manager. This asymmetry reflects the fact that foreign firms operating in China have little or
no incentive to exert effort in firms they do not own, unlike their Chinese partners.
(A.1) When Nash bargaining breaks down, the party owning the factory is entitled to
the residual profits that flow from completing the project using services purchased
on the spot market. If the foreign partner owns the factory,  O  0, it hires a
domestic distribution agent to sell its output on the domestic market. If the Chinese
partner owns the factory,  O  1, it pays the foreign firm a licensing fee for use of its
technology.
(A.2) Under the spot contracts in (A.1) the parties earn only a fraction of their
marginal products. Specifically, we assume the payoffs are (1- ) times the first-best
level. As FH note,  may be interpreted as a measure of human-capital specificity of
these investments or, alternatively, the ability to contract over them. We allow the
degree of specificity to vary across the production tasks:  IPR reflects the
proportionate loss in return on technology adaptation effort if the foreign firm
licenses it rather than uses it within firm boundaries,  C is the proportionate loss in
the return to production control effort, and  M is the proportionate loss in return to
marketing effort.
(A.3) If the foreign partner owns the factory and Nash bargaining breaks down, the
Chinese partner seeks a job elsewhere. His prior investment in marketing is valued if
and only if he has been in control of production. This reflects the difference
between being viewed by potential outside employers as a technical, rather than sales,
representative for a foreign enterprise. Production control also influences the threat
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point payoff for the foreign firm. Because technology transfer may occur outside his
control, we assume that if bargaining breaks down, the foreign partner receives only
a portion of the value of its technological adaptation effort, even if it owns the
firm.92
(A.4) If the Chinese partner owns the factory and Nash bargaining breaks down, the
foreign partner is not rewarded for any effort, whether in adapting technology or
controlling production.93
These assumptions are similar to those in FH, except that we allow for the possibility
of intellectual property violations if the technology is transferred outside the boundaries of
the foreign firm. We make the extreme assumption that this form of transfer can occur even
if the foreign firm engages in a joint venture.
In bargaining over division of the surplus, the foreign firm has the primitive
bargaining weight,  , while the Chinese firm has bargaining weight, 1   .94 With threat
point payoffs denoted  j , j  f , s , and total profits defined by (4.3.1.1), profits earned by
each party are

Party f receives  f   (   s )  (1   ) f ,
Party s receives  s  (1   )(   f )   s .

(4.3.2.1)

It is widely recognized that the Chinese government preferred joint ventures to wholly owned foreign
enterprises because the EJV promised more transfer of technology and production know-how to the Chinese
managers. See Sutter (2000) for further discussion.
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A similar assumption is used by Antràs (2003), who assumes that investments by either party of a trade
relationship are completely relationship-specific and that if the relationship breaks down, the value of the
inputs outside the relationship is 0.
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Nash bargaining with fixed bargaining weights is maintained not only in Feenstra and Hanson (2005) but also
in models with firm productivity heterogeneity, such as Antràs and Helpman (2004).
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Each party chooses effort levels to maximize the difference between these payoffs and the
costs of supplying efforts. Using our assumptions about threat-point payoffs, marginal
investment incentives can be derived for each organizational form. If the foreign firm owns
the factory, then (A.1) to (A.4) imply:

 f
e1
 f
e1
 f
e2

 B /  f ; if  C  0
 B(1  IPR ) /  f ; if  C  1
(4.3.2.2)

 ( A   B) /  f ; if  C  0

 s
 (1  C )( A   B) /  s ; if  C  1.
e2
As seen by (4.3.2.1), ownership provides less than full incentives for the foreign partner to
adapt its technology to local market conditions since some share of its value is eroded by
having exposed the Chinese partner to its proprietary technology. Ownership, however,
does provide full incentives to exert effort adapting production to its own technological
specifications. The Chinese partner, however, if given production control, earns a fraction
of the marginal product of his efforts on the spot market and, thus, has less than full
incentives to adapt local production to the foreign technology.
When the foreign partner has residual property rights, the Chinese partner has an
incentive to use his connections to lower per unit marketing costs if and only if he controls
production. This implies that when the foreign firm owns the factory, marginal incentives
for marketing effort by the Chinese firm are:
 s
  C [(1  M ) PM ] /  s .
e3
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(4.3.2.3)

Because the Chinese partner will not be rewarded for marketing effort should bargaining
break down, he will not exert any if he does not also control production.
If the Chinese partner owns the project and has residual property rights (A.1) to
(A.4) imply:
 s
 PM /  s ;
e3
 f
e2

 0; if  C  0

(4.3.2.4)

 s
 ( A  (1  C ) B) /  s ; if  C  1.
e2

With ownership, the Chinese partner has full marginal incentives in marketing. However, if
bargaining breaks down, customers will consider the Chinese partner‟s efforts to raise quality
through production effort as less successful since in that case the technology is only licensed.
Therefore, he earns his full marginal product of effort reducing production costs (A), but
less than full marginal product raising sales revenue (  B ). As defined by (A.4), if given
production control the foreign partner has no incentive to exert effort since effort adds
nothing to his outside option. Combined with the assumption that  f   s , this behavior
implies that it will never be optimal for the parties to choose Chinese ownership with foreign
production control as the venture‟s organizational form.
With Chinese ownership, the foreign firm receives no payment for effort if
bargaining breaks down, as defined by (A.4). Therefore,

 f
e1

 0.

Imperfect contracting over technology leads the foreign firm to have less than full marginal
incentives to adapt its technology for the Chinese market.
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(4.3.2.5)

Effort levels can be found under each organizational form using the marginal
investment incentives (4.3.2.2) to (4.3.2.5). Inspection of the effort levels in Table 4.1
indicates that Chinese ownership with foreign production control arrangement is dominated
by Chinese ownership and control. Efforts devoted to technology adaptation and marketing
are the same across the two regimes, but production effort is lower with the split
arrangement. As a result, profits under Chinese ownership and production control are at
least as high as they are under split ownership and control. Consequently, we would not
expect to observe the organizational form Chinese ownership-with-foreign control in the
data.
In other organizational arrangements, ownership leads to full marginal incentives for
effort by the partner with residual property rights, the exception being foreign ownership but
Chinese production control. In this case, the foreign firm devotes less than first-best effort
to adapting its technology because if bargaining breaks down, some of its efforts will be lost
through “leakage” of its proprietary technology to the Chinese partner. This joint venture
arrangement, however, induces the Chinese partner to exert greater effort in marketing
because production control ameliorates the holdup problem when the foreign firm owns the
project. Thus, for some projects a joint venture will be preferred by both partners.

4.3.3. Comparison of Alternative Organizational Forms
We use the individually optimal effort levels given in Table 4.1 to compute and
compare the total surplus W ( O ,  C ) generated by each ownership and control arrangement.
Because our empirical approach is based upon a sample of established equity joint ventures,
we compare the surplus generated by a wholly foreign owned (WFOE) or wholly domestic
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owned (DOM) enterprise to that generated by a joint venture with foreign ownership and
Chinese production control (SFJV). As in FH, these comparisons have a linear form and
can be expressed as:

WFOE v. SFJV: W (0, 0)  W (0,1)  a1B 2  c1 ( A   B) 2  d1PM2 ;
DOM v. SFJV: W (1,1)  W (0,1)  a2 B 2  c2 ( A   B) 2  d 2 PM2 .
Project surplus comparisons depend on three characteristics of the firm. Recalling the firstbest effort levels, we may interpret B 2 as the income generated by technological adaptation,

( A   B)2 as the value added in production, and PM2 as the income generated by domestic
marketing effort, when each is evaluated at the first best.95
Using the effort levels in Table 4.1 to compute and compare project surplus, we can
determine the signs of the coefficients in (4.3.3.1). Comparing a WFOE to a SFJV,
concentrating ownership and control in the foreign partner leads to greater effort in both
technology and production adaptation, while providing less incentive for the Chinese firm to
market the final product to domestic customers. Therefore, for comparison of a WFOE to
a SFJV, a1  0; c1  0; d1  0. Comparing a DOM to a SFJV, concentrating ownership and
control in the Chinese partner leads to greater effort in both marketing and production,
while providing less incentive for the foreign firm to adapt its technology to Chinese
production conditions. Therefore, for comparison of a domestic owned enterprise to a
SFJV, a2  0; c2  0; d2  0 .

See Feenstra and Hanson (2005, p. 749) for a thorough discussion of these interpretations in the context of
their model.
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(4.3.3.1)

4.4. Empirical Strategy
Our empirical strategy is based on the liberalizations that occurred with Chinese
accession to the WTO, which allowed equity joint venture partners greater latitude in
choosing the organizational form that provides the highest surplus value. As discussed in
section II, foreign investors were constrained in their mode of entry into China prior to
2000, but that substantial changes in law and policy associated with China‟s WTO accession
significantly eased investors‟ ability to shape the form of their investments. Our
presumption is that the determinants of surplus value identified by our theoretical model will
predict which enterprises shift from a joint venture to a wholly owned enterprise. For
example, firms using advanced technology may find that, once relieved of the export
requirements that had been imposed on WFOEs, project surplus is higher if they operate as
a wholly owned subsidiary and invest more in technology than was optimal when they
operated as a joint venture. Similarly, projects in which a significant share of value is added
domestically on the shop floor may find that project surplus is higher if they operate as a
domestic Chinese enterprise and bring their production effort closer to first-best.

4.4.1. Econometric Specification
Our sample consists of all Sino-foreign equity joint venture projects established
between 1992 and 2000, operating “above scale” and, therefore, included in the Annual
Survey of Industrial Firms, and surviving as an ongoing industrial enterprise until 2006.96 We
observe transitions from the initial joint-venture arrangement into one of three forms:

Anecdotal evidence and interviews with joint venture managers suggest that few projects switched from a
SFJV to a wholly owned enterprise prior to 2000. Exact numbers are not available; a firm-level panel can only
be constructed from 1998 onward.
96

86

continuing as an equity joint venture (SFJV), transitioning to a wholly owned foreign
enterprise (WFOE), or transitioning to a domestic enterprise without foreign equity
participation (DOM). We use our theoretical model to predict which firms, conditional on
characteristics observed by 2000, will change status from an equity joint venture into one of
the two wholly owned forms.
EJV partners choose the organizational form that maximizes the surplus value,
which we do not observe directly, but instead treat as a latent variable, Wi * . Our model
provides an expression for the unobserved latent variable, Wi*  X i   i , where X is a
vector of enterprise characteristics,  i is a coefficient vector associated with organization
form i, and  i is a random error term. We observe Wi , where

*
*
*
*

 1, Wi  max WSFJV ,WWFOE ,WDOM 
Wi  

 0, otherwise

(4.4.1.1)

We assume errors are distributed i.i.d. and have an extreme value distribution.97 The
probability of choosing organization form i is given by
pi  exp( X i ) / D, i  1, 2 and p3  1/ D

(4.4.1.2)

2

where D  1   exp( X i ).
i 1

We use the multinomial logit (MNL) model to estimate the coefficient vectors  i , allowing
the SFJV form to be the reference choice. Consequently, coefficients for this choice are set
equal to zero. Equations (4.3.3.1) provide expressions for the difference in surplus value for
97

k

The cumulative distribution function is given by F ( wi  k )  exp( e )
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the two wholly owned forms versus a joint venture. This expression guides our choice of
regressors, which we construct to measure the value to the firm of technological effort,
production effort, and marketing effort. As frequently noted, the empirical tractability of the
MNL model is obtained at the expense of strong maintained assumptions, particularly the
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). Although restrictive, tests proposed by
Hausman and McFadden (1980) indicate that IIA is appropriate for our application.98

4.4.2. Data
Data used in this study are drawn from the Annual Surveys of Industrial Production
conducted by the Chinese government‟s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). The Annual
Surveys of Industrial Production includes all non-state owned firms whose annual sales
exceed 5 million yuan (referred to as “above-scale” industrial firms) and all state-owned
enterprises.99, 100 The dataset contains detailed information on the firm and its operations,
including geographic administrative code, ownership type, gross industrial output value,
value added, export value, total employment, capital stock, and intermediate inputs. In
addition to ownership and location information, we make extensive use of the industry
identifiers in the dataset. The ASIF classifies enterprises using the four-digit Chinese
Industrial Classification (CIC) system. CIC codes were readjusted and renumbered in

Using the Hausman and McFadden (1980) test, we fail to reject the null hypothesis that IIA holds at greater
than the 96% significance level.
98

99The

NBS classifies non state-owned enterprises to include collectively-owned enterprises, Chinese indigenous
privately-owned enterprises, and foreign-owned enterprises operating in China. The industry section of China
Statistical Yearbook is compiled based on this dataset. Basic information of each four-digit industry in the
China Markets Yearbook is also based on this dataset.
100

This amounts to approximately $US 600,000 over this period.
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2003.101 Consequently, we recode observations in years prior to 2003 thereby ensuring that
industry codes are comparable across the sample period.
Sino-foreign joint ventures are identified by the registration codes assigned to the
firm.102 The final dataset includes 12,443 Sino-foreign joint ventures in 2000 that were
established between 1992 and 2000, and which we use to create our balanced panel. Figure
4.2 shows that by 2006, 79.6% of these joint ventures remain as SFJVs; 13.6% become
wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOE) while 6.7% become wholly domestic-owned
enterprises (DOM).103
The property rights theory suggests that transitions from one organizational form to
another can be explained by three characteristics of the joint venture: the value added by
technology adaptation effort (B), value added by production effort ( A   B), and value
added by domestic marketing effort ( PM ) . Allowing for heterogeneity among enterprises, we
treat each of these values as firm specific and use firm-level data to create measures of them.
All firm-level characteristics are measured as of 2000, prior to their transitions from one
form to another. All variables are defined and descriptive statistics displayed in Table 4.2.
To capture the value added by technology adaptation effort, we create a measure of
how technologically advanced the joint venture is relative to domestic firms operating in the
Prior to 2003, NBS followed GB/T 4754 - 1994 industry classification system and 2003 onwards GB/T
4754 - 2002 was adopted. Two changes were made in the 2 digit divisions: (i) the 1994 division 39 (“Arms and
Ammunition Manufacturing”) was added to 2002 division 36 (“Special Equipment Manufacturing”). Then the
remaining 2002 division codes were renumbered accordingly i.e. 1994 division 40 corresponds to 2002 division
39, 1994 division 41 corresponds to 2002 division 40, 1994 division 42 corresponds to 2002 division 41, and
1994 division 43 corresponds to 2002 division 42 (ii) 2002 division 43 (“Waste Resources and Old Material
Recycling and Processing”) was added which was not part of manufacturing in the previous period.
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Registration codes 210, 220, 310, and 320 are categorized as SFJVs.

If a firm transitions into multiple states throughout the sample period, only the first transition state is
considered. Multiple transitions are very rare in the data.
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same industry. The presumption inherent in this choice is that effort by the foreign partner
is more valuable the more advanced the technology used by the Chinese factory relative to
that used by domestic competitors. This regressor, which we call “distance from domestic
technology frontier” is calculated as the difference between a firm‟s own TFP (measured in logs)
and the maximum TFP of the domestic Chinese firm within its two-digit industry in 2000.
We calculate TFP for each enterprise using the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology.104
We measure value added by production effort using firm value added, while adding the
level of employment at the enterprise as an additional control for enterprise size. The ASIF
provides information on nominal value added and we converted this to real value added
using the Brandt-Rawski two digit industry output deflators (Brandt, Biesebroeck, Zhang,
2005).105
The third effort measure, domestic sales share, reflects the value of the Chinese partner
efforts creating domestic sales. To capture this at the firm level, we use the firm‟s local
(Chinese) sales as a share of total sales. Perhaps surprisingly, even within industries
enterprises have widely varying degrees of success in selling locally.
We push our model and data further by testing for differences in the probability of
switching organizational form in ways suggested by the property rights theory and Chinese
laws and policies. First, because the propensity for Chinese officials to approve the creation
of a WFOE varies by industry and by province, we estimate the MNL adding industry and
province fixed effects. Secondly, we introduce interactions between our three main

Carried out using the Stata module opreg (Yasar, Raciborski, Poi, 2008). Appendix 3A provides details on
our use of the Olley-Pakes (1996) methodology and estimates of capital and labor coefficients at the two-digit
CIC.
104

105

The deflators are available at http://www.econ.kuleuven.be/public/N07057/CHINA/appendix/.
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regressors and variables that capture regional or industrial variation in the outside options
available to SFJV partners.
Our first interaction term is an interaction between our technology measure, distance
from the domestic frontier, and a dummy variable indicating whether or not the Chinese
partner has a central government or provincial government affiliation. Our hypothesis is
that foreign partners in joint ventures with powerful government affiliation will be better
compensated for any technological adaptations they make, should bargaining with their local
partner break down. While certainly the foreign partner may have lower bargaining power if
the Chinese partner has powerful connections, these connections also may raise the profits
that flow from Chinese operations by blocking direct competition from domestic private
firms, other foreign competitors, or other state firms. Indeed, some of the most successful
joint ventures in China have powerful local partners. For example, one of the most
successful overseas-funded industrial enterprises in China is Shanghai Volkswagen Co, Ltd.,
a joint venture between Volkswagen and the Shanghai government.
Our second interaction is an interaction between firm-level value added and a
measure of the production manager‟s outside employment options. Our hypothesis is that
in locations where managers have many options within the same industry, they will be willing
to exert more effort within the relationship as they will be better compensated should
bargaining break down. Our measure of the manager’s outside option is the share of all firms in
the manager‟s city that are in the same four-digit industry. Creation of this variable requires
use of the full ASIF database as well as geo-coding of all enterprises in the database. The
dataset provides six digit county codes where the first two digits represent the province, the
second two the city, and finally the last two digits designate the county.
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Our third interaction is an interaction between our measure of the value added by
domestic marketing effort, share of domestic sales, and a measure of growth in the state
share of sales in that four-digit industry between 1998 and 2000. Our hypothesis is that
marketing effort will be more important in industries where the state is expanding operations
rather than retreating.

4.5. Multinomial Logit Results
4.5.1. Testing the Property Rights Model
Regression coefficients and their standard errors from the MNL model are displayed
in Table 4.3. Because SFJV is the reference form, the estimated coefficients reflect the effect
of X i on the likelihood of switching to organization form i relative to remaining as a joint
venture. We begin by including in the MNL estimation only the three enterprise
characteristics suggested by the property rights model. We add industry and then industry
and province fixed effects, each in turn. We calculate both the Schwarz and the Aikake
criterion for model selection, and find that the former favors the model without industry and
province controls while the latter points to the model with both sets of fixed effects.
Because both models lead to similar conclusions regarding tests of the property rights
theory, we have no reason to favor one over the other.
Model (1) in Table 4.3 does not include industry or province controls. Looking at
this first model, we see that the data strongly support the theoretical predictions, with one
exception. Considering first the level of technology used by the enterprise, as measured by
the distance between the venture‟s own TFP and the maximum of similar domestic
operations, we find that relatively technologically advanced firms are significantly more likely
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to become wholly foreign owned and significantly less likely to become wholly domestic
owed than they are to remain joint ventures. This result is consistent with the hypothesis
that foreign managers exert more effort transferring technology to their Chinese subsidiaries
when they own the entire operation.
Moving down the column, we see that firms with larger value added, controlling for
enterprise employment, are significantly more likely to become wholly foreign owned and
less likely to become wholly domestic owned than they are to remain joint ventures. Again,
this finding is consistent with the property rights theory, which predicts that managers will
exert more effort when they also own the firm. We note that the theory predicted no
difference between the managerial effort exerted in a SFJV and a wholly domestic enterprise
and, in the absence of industry and province controls, we find the coefficient on log value
added is insignificant in explaining the propensity of firms to become wholly domestically
owned. We also note that the size of the firm, as measured by enterprise employment, is
significant only for the transition to wholly domestic ownership: joint ventures that employ
more workers are more likely to be acquired by their domestic partner than are smaller
ventures. Employment size seems to play no role in the transition to wholly foreign owned.
Continuing with the next regressor in Table 4.3, domestic sales share, again we find
the results consistent with the theoretical predictions. A large domestic sales share makes it
significantly less likely that the SFJV will switch to a WFOE while a large domestic sales
share makes it significantly more likely that the SFJV will become a wholly domestic firm.
This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the Chinese partner is more willing to
cultivate and use its domestic connections to gain domestic customers when it is assured
residual rights to profits from these sales.
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In model (2) we introduce two-digit industry controls. As mentioned above, because
regulations and policies guiding the approval of foreign acquisitions varies by industry, the
associations we have uncovered between transition probabilities and firm characteristics
could be entirely industry specific. Importantly, the coefficients estimated with these
controls for the three firm-level characteristics vary very little from those estimated without
them. Indeed, some coefficients become more significant. The only unexpected result is
that the negative coefficient estimated for log value added in the likelihood of switching to
DOM becomes highly significant. As noted above, the theory suggests that this coefficient
should be insignificantly different from zero and the fact that it is negative and highly
significant poses an interesting puzzle. Strictly interpreted, the result suggests that Chinese
managers are willing to exert less effort when the enterprise is fully domestically owned than
when it is foreign owned. While outside the scope of this study, this finding suggests that
there may be important differences in human resource management by foreign and domestic
owners and that these differences influence the effort levels of managers.106
In model (3) we introduce both industry and province controls. Because only the
largest projects require central government approval, provincial government policies may
significantly influence the ability of firms to switch ownership forms. The introduction of
provincial controls reduces the magnitude of our estimated coefficients somewhat, but no
signs or significance levels are affected. Therefore, the general consistency of our MNL
results with our theoretical predictions is maintained, even when we include both industry
and province fixed effects.

Yan and Warner (2002) discuss indigenous management practices, especially human resource management,
and their relevance to the choice of organizational form for multinational firms.
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Table 4.4 provides estimated elasticities and associated standard errors for the
regression explanatory variables in Table 4.3, with respect to the probability share for each
organization form. Looking at model (3), which includes both provincial and industry fixed
effects, we find that changes in value added lead to the largest changes in the probability of
switching from a SFJV. A one percentage change in value added, controlling for
employment, reduces the probability of switching from a joint venture to a domestic firm by
0.93 percent while increasing the probability of becoming a WFOE by 0.67 percent. Raising
productivity, relative to domestic firms in the same four-digit industry, by one percent
boosts the likelihood of switching from a joint venture to a WFOE by 0.19 percent while
decreasing the likelihood of the domestic partner buying out the foreign investor by 0.35
percent. A percent increase in the share of sales sold locally works in the opposite direction,
however, raising the probability of switching to a wholly domestic firm by 0.56 percent while
reducing the probability of becoming a wholly foreign owned enterprise by 0.25 percent.

4.5.2. Allowing for Differences across Firms and Markets
We use interaction terms to test whether differences in partner affiliation, local
industrial concentration, and state ownership influence the decision to switch organizational
forms. Table 4.5 provides the MNL estimates for this model, which interacts the three main
regressors drawn from property rights theory with variables that attempt to capture aspects
of each partner‟s outside options.
In model (1), we see that an interaction of technological distance with partner
affiliation is negative and highly significant. Indeed, when the affiliation dummy takes the
value of unity, distance from the domestic technology frontier is associated with a lower
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rather than higher probability of switching from a joint venture to a WFOE. This result
implies that foreign investors affiliated with central or provincial governments are less likely
to buy out their domestic joint venture partner, controlling for enterprise productivity.
Using the property rights theory as a lens, this suggests that powerful affiliation protects the
property rights of foreign technology providers, perhaps by reducing local start-ups by
former employees familiar with the technology. Powerful affiliation also makes it less likely
that the joint venture will become wholly domestic owned, conditional on productivity, again
suggesting a strengthening of the outside option for the foreign partner within the
relationship. As seen in models (2) and (3) in Table 4.5, including industry fixed effects or
industry and province fixed effects does not change these conclusions.
We interact the enterprise‟s value added with a measure of the Chinese manager‟s
outside option: the density of own-industry firms located in the same city as the joint
venture. Again using the property rights model as a lens, increases in own-industry density
should make it easier for a manager to gain similar employment should Nash bargaining
inside the joint venture break down. Consequently, increases in own-industry density should
reduce the influence of value added on transition probabilities because manager effort is
easier to obtain inside the SFJV relationship. Looking at model (1), we see that the estimates
support this interpretation as the influence on value added on the transition probability is
smaller for enterprises in cities with better outside options. For transitions to wholly foreign
owned, the estimated coefficient is -0.874 and it is highly significant. When evaluated at the
mean, enterprises with larger value added remain more likely to become WFOEs although
this effect is smaller in cities with better outside options for managers. Interestingly, in the
transition from SFJV to DOM, the interaction of value added and manager‟s outside option
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is insignificant at the 5% level across all specifications. As in models estimated without
interactions, higher value added makes it significantly more likely that the firm will remain a
joint venture rather than become wholly domestic owned. Again, the motivation of
managers inside wholly domestic firms appears to be different than that suggested by the
property rights model.
Lastly, we include an interaction of the share of sales sold on domestic markets and
the change in state share of industry sales. 107 The hypothesis is that in industries where state
dominance is growing, having a Chinese partner is more important for a joint venture
attempting to make local sales. For the transition to WFOE, this interaction is positive but
insignificant across all models. For the transition to DOM, the interaction is significant
when we add industry fixed effects or industry and province fixed effects. We conclude that
increasing in state dominance of the industry does not significantly influence the value of
having a domestic partner for firms selling to local markets.

4.6. Conclusions
Changes in policy and practice signaled by China‟s accession to the WTO offer a rare
opportunity to observe how multinationals respond to changes in property rights in a
developing country. WTO accession reduced incentives for multinational firms to form
joint ventures with Chinese enterprises while simultaneously reducing constraints placed on
operation of wholly owned subsidiaries. Changes in Chinese leadership also produced a
more liberal investment environment for indigenous Chinese investors. An adaptation of
the property rights model developed by Feenstra and Hanson (2005) suggests that higher the
We also created a variable measuring the state share of downstream sales for the enterprise‟s industry, using
the 2002 Chinese input-output table. This variable was never significant, as an interaction term or a regressor.
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productivity and value added of the joint venture, but lower its domestic sales share, the
more likely the joint venture will be to transition to a wholly foreign owned subsidiary
following liberalization of the choice of organization form. The theory also suggests that
enterprises with lower productivity but higher value added and domestic sales share will be
more likely to be acquired by their Chinese partners, transitioning from joint ventures to
wholly domestic firms.
Using newly created enterprise-level panel data on equity joint ventures and changes
in registration type following China‟s WTO accession, we find evidence consistent with the
property rights theory of organization form. Enterprises with higher productivity, measured
by the distance of their estimated TFP from the maximum TFP of domestic firms in the
same industry, are more likely to become WFOEs and less likely to become wholly domestic
firms. This finding indicates that the decision by the Chinese leadership to liberalize its
stance toward wholly foreign owned firms may indeed promote greater transfer of
technology to China, as is its intent. While the foreign business community continues to
question China‟s commitment to IPR protection, this finding does indicate that WTO
accession created a regime change strong enough to alter incentives that guide the choice of
multinationals‟ organizational form.108
We also find that joint ventures having affiliations with central or provincial
governments are less likely to become wholly owned by their foreign partners, given the

A recent and prominent criticism of China‟s stance toward IPR protection comes from Ian Bremmer,
Chairman of the Eurasia Group, who voices the fears of Western multinationals when he states, “What China
needs is technology, advanced technology, quite advanced technology. But Western corporations, increasingly,
aren‟t willing to provide that level of technology, especially given how bad intellectual property protection and
regulation is in China” (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010, p.3).
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extent of their productivity advantage over domestic competitors. We have interpreted this
result as an indication that powerful affiliations within China work to protect the intellectual
property of the foreign partner and, thus, raise the effort they exert within the joint-venture
and reduce the value of buying out of the relationship. This finding is consistent with views
powerfully expressed and carefully supported by Yasheng Huang (2008), who argues that
state-affiliated firms maintain an advantage over unaffiliated domestic entrepreneurs. It is
possible that foreign firms, aided by state affiliation, are shielded from competition from
indigenous start-ups. There are many dimensions to this issue that warrant further research,
with policy implications stretching beyond foreign technology transfer to the promotion of
indigenous entrepreneurship.
Our results also suggest that selling to local Chinese markets remains difficult for
foreign firms without local connections. Perhaps this is to be expected in a society in which
the rule of law is new, discretion in the application of the law remains great, and property
rights are evolving rapidly. Nevertheless, the significant of domestic sales share as a
predictor of which firms will choose to be wholly foreign or wholly domestic owned
suggests that access to the Chinese market is certain to generate continuing WTO dispute
settlement activity.
Taken together, our findings affirm the relevance of property rights and incomplete
contracts as a determinant of firm behavior within China. While previous theory and
empirics have focused on ownership and control over input search among export processing
operations in China, we extend the literature to consider how evolving property rights alter
decisions about ownership and control for enterprises serving, at least partially, the domestic
Chinese market. Our results suggest that changing incentives for technology, production,
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and marketing effort provide a useful guide to organizational choices made by both Chinese
and foreign investors. They also indicate that improvements in contractibility influence
firms in ways that depend on firm-level characteristics, a finding in keeping with the
theoretical insights of Antràs and Helpman (2008), who also stress heterogeneity in firm
response to improvement in property rights. They also support the contention that external
commitment to liberalization of foreign business operations through rigorous WTO
accession procedures influences multinational and indigenous firms‟ behavior. Embedded
incentives for particular organizational forms, therefore, emerge as determinants of firms‟
response to evolving property rights.
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Appendix 2A: Balancing Tests, All Industries.

Sample
Unmatched

Mean
OECD HMT
6.0541 5.8613

% Bias
8.9

Matched

6.0603 6.0958

-1.6

Unmatched
Matched

10.184
10.00
10.184 10.232

Sales Squared

Unmatched
Matched

Capital per Worker

Variable
TFP

Sales

Wage per Worker

Age

Age2

Export Intensity

State Equity Share

%
Reduction
|Bias|

t-test
t
p>t
2.55
0.011

81.6

-0.46

0.648

8.8
-2.3

74.1

2.51
-0.65

0.012
0.515

108.31 104.18
108.31 108.02

12.9
0.9

92.8

3.72
0.26

0.000
0.798

Unmatched
Matched

3.8455 3.6912
3.8446 3.8854

7.2
-0.0

99.5

2.06
-0.01

0.040
0.992

Unmatched
Matched

2.2764 2.1825
2.2767 2.2897

8.7
-1.2

86.1

2.50
-0.33

0.013
0.741

Unmatched
Matched

1.5838 1.6173
1.5836 1.5591

-3.7
2.7

26.8

-1.07
0.75

0.287
0.451

Unmatched
Matched

3.3195 3.4195
3.3192 3.1948

-2.6
3.3

-24.5

-0.75
1.00

0.455
0.318

Unmatched
Matched

.33588 .34647
.33610 .33622

-2.5
-0.0

98.9

-0.72
-0.01

0.474
0.994

Unmatched
Matched

.48352 .44528
.48058 .47684

8.4
0.8

90.2

2.39
0.231

0.017
0.821

Notes: Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); Total factor productivity (TFP) measured
using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; All variables, other than those expressed as shares, are in the log
form.
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Appendix 2B: Industry Ranking by Domestic Content.
Two Digit
CIC
13
15
36
31
24
42
29
23
17
26
28
41
27
21
37
33
14
25
19
22
39
32
35
20
40
18
34
30

Industry Name
Processing of Food from Agricultural Products
Manufacture of Beverages
Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery
Manufacture of Non-metallic Mineral Products
Manufacture of Articles For Culture, Education and Sport Activity
Manufacture of Artwork and Other Manufacturing
Manufacture of Rubber
Printing, Reproduction of Recording Media
Manufacture of Textile
Manufacture of Raw Chemical Materials and Chemical Products
Manufacture of Chemical Fibers
Manufacture of Measuring Instruments and Machinery for Cultural Activity
and Office Work
Manufacture of Medicines
Manufacture of Furniture
Manufacture of Transport Equipment
Smelting and Pressing of Non-ferrous Metals
Manufacture of Foods
Processing of Petroleum, Coking, Processing of Nuclear Fuel
Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products
Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Equipment
Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals
Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery
Processing of Timber, Manufacture of Wood, Bamboo, Rattan, Palm, and
Straw Products
Manufacture of Communication Equipment, Computers and Other
Electronic Equipment
Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps
Manufacture of Metal Products
Manufacture of Plastics

Source: Author‟s calculations.
Notes: See section 5.5 for details on calculation of domestic content (DC).
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DC
0.943
0.940
0.925
0.920
0.920
0.908
0.871
0.859
0.857
0.853
0.846
0.838
0.828
0.824
0.810
0.772
0.749
0.741
0.740
0.732
0.727
0.725
0.706
0.590
0.585
0.584
0.455
0.240

Appendix 2C: Number of Acquired Firms, By Industry.
Two Digit CIC
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
39
40
41
42
Total

OECD

HMT

96
58
35
111
147
72
31
17
26
11
43
8
90
47
6
14
63
82
23
17
70
92
30
69
78
99
15
43
1,493

69
45
21
214
202
97
33
24
51
36
45
4
107
41
5
7
122
120
21
18
94
56
26
47
100
115
29
64
1,813

Notes: The table reports number of acquired firms by twodigit Chinese Industrial Classification (CIC). Industry 16
“Tobacco Products and Processing” has been excluded. The
numbers exclude firms that switch two-digit industry postacquisition. All firms are on the common support.
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Appendix 2D: Multinomial Logit Model of Number of Foreign Acquisitions, Textile
Industry Only.
OECD

HMT

Sales Squared

0.058
(0.061)
-0.132
(0.217)
0.017*

-0.065**
(0.031)
-0.293***
(0.083)
0.028***

Capital per Worker

(0.010)
0.008

(0.004)
-0.068**

(0.045)
0.014
(0.083)
0.049
(0.187)

(0.035)
0.096
(0.059)
0.059
(0.299)

-0.147***
(0.054)
0.606***
(0.150)
1.217***
(0.133)
-7.273***
(1.136)

-0.127
(0.094)
0.391***
(0.121
1.125***
(0.118)
-5.077***
(0.459)

TFP
Sales

Wage per Worker
Age
Age2
Export Intensity
State Equity Share
Constant
Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo-R2
Schwarz criterion
Aikake criterion

116,074
-4,958.49
0.06
10,383.46
9,996.98

Notes: The base category are all firms not acquired by HMT or OECD
investors; Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; Significant at *
10% , ** 5%, *** 1% levels; Export intensity measured as (value of
exports/total sales); All regressions include year, region, and two-digit
industry dummies; All explanatory variables, other than dummies or
those expressed as shares, enter in the log form.
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Appendix 2E: Balancing Tests, Textile Industry Only.
%
Reduction

Mean
Variable

Sample

OECD

HMT

% Bias

TFP

Unmatched
Matched

5.9005
5.9005

5.6039
6.9666

16.8
-3.8

Unmatched
Matched

10.111
10.111

9.9761
10.315

8.0
-12.0

Unmatched
Matched

104.49
104.49

103.00
107.84

5.9
-13.1

Unmatched
Matched

3.2972
3.2972

3.2926
3.5666

0.20
-14.3

Unmatched
Matched

2.1570
2.1570

2.0777
2.1422

9.1
1.7

Unmatched
Matched

1.5824
1.5824

1.6586
1.5898

-8.0
-0.4

Unmatched
Matched

3.3008
3.3008

3.5974
3.1207

-7.9
4.8

Unmatched
Matched

0.51027
0.51027

0.4515
0.4737

13.3
8.3

Unmatched
Matched

0.41822
0.41822

0.39699
0.41383

4.8
1.0

Real Sales

Real Sales
Squared

Capital per
Worker

Wage per
Worker

Age

Age2

Export Intensity

State Equity
Share

t-test

|Bias|

t

p>t

77.7

2.06
-0.51

0.040
0.610

-50.5

0.98
-1.70

0.326
0.090

-123.7

0.73
-1.61

0.465
0.107

-5,864.7

-0.03
-1.87

0.977
0.062

81.3

1.16
0.20

0.245
0.843

94.7

-1.01
-0.05

0.314
0.958

39.3

-0.95
0.80

0.344
0.425

37.8

1.68
0.94

0.094
0.349

79.3

0.60
0.11

0.550
0.913

Notes: Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); Total factor productivity (TFP)
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; All variables, other than those expressed as shares, are
in the log form; Textile industry is composed of two-digit CIC industries 17 (Manufacture of Textile)
and 18 (Manufacture of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps).
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Appendix 3A: TFP Measure using Olley-Pakes (1996).

The Olley and Pakes (1996) method corrects for two issues that arise when
calculating productivity as the residual from an OLS regression. First, OLS estimate of the
production function leads to biased coefficients on labor due to simultaneity bias.
Simultaneity bias arises since the variable input choice of a firm is positively correlated with
its productivity. Firms will increase employment if they experience positive productivity
shocks and vice versa. Fixed effects could be used to address this problem if we are willing
to assume that the productivity shocks do not vary over time.
Second, sample selection bias arises when using OLS due to the exit of firms because
of adverse productivity shocks. For example, if more productive firms are also more capital
intensive, they will be able to better withstand periods of low or negative productivity shocks
in anticipation of future profitability so that OLS estimation of the capital coefficient will be
biased downwards. The Olley and Pakes methodology uses investment as a proxy for
unobserved productivity to address these two issues and obtain consistent estimates of the
labor and capital coefficients.
Input coefficients are calculated for each two digit industry under the Chinese
Industrial Classification system. Then these coefficients are used to calculate the log TFP of
each enterprise as:
̂

̂

where value added and the input coefficients are in logs and ̂ and ̂ are estimated under
the Olley and Pakes methodology. As expected, OLS produces larger estimates of the labor
coefficients but smaller capital coefficients than the Olley and Pakes method.
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Appendix 3B: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise TFP (Olley-Pakes)
STATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

PRIVATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

FOREIGN OWNED
(1)
(2)

Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry
Dummies
City*Year Dummies
4-Digit Industry Dummies
Adjusted R

2

# Enterprises

0.014***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.003)
-0.001
(0.004)
Y

0.013***
(0.003)
0.032***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
-

-0.001
(0.002)
0.025***
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)
Y

-0.004
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.007)
0.002
(0.003)
-

0.001
(0.001)
0.010***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)
Y

0.002
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.003)
0.014***
(0.002)
-

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.47

0.47

0.49

0.46

0.54

0.55

58,879

58,879

1,092,188

1,092,188

334,888

334,888

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at
the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Appendix 3C: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise TFP (Olley-Pakes)
STATE OWNED
PRIVATE OWNED

ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

NON-ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.014***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.003)
0.005
(0.05)
-0.007*
(0.004)

0.014***
(0.003)
0.032***
(0.004)
0.005
(0.005)
-0.004
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.002)
0.024***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)

-0.004
(0.003)
0.026***
(0.007)
-0.001
(0.003)
0.004**
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

0.003
(0.002)
0.011***
(0.003)
0.013***
(0.005)
0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)
0.012***
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.003)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)

Year, City, 4-Digit Industry
Dummies
City*Year Dummies

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

4-Digit Industry Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.47

0.47

0.49

0.46

0.56

0.58

0.52

0.53

58,879

58,879

1,092,188

1,092,188

178,933

178,933

155,955

155,955

Log Own Industry
Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Ethnically Chinese-owned)
(Non-ethnically Chineseowned)

Adjusted R

2

# Enterprises

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5%
level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Figure 2.1: TFP Distribution of Acquired Firms in the Pre-Acquisition Period.

Notes: TFP measured using the Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method.

Figure 2.2: Source Distribution of Foreign Projects, By Province, 1993 – 1996.
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Source: Dean, Lovely, Wang (2005).
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Figure 3.1: Employment by Ownership Type, 1998-2006.
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Source: Author‟s calculations.
Notes: SOE (state-owned enterprises), POE (private-owned enterprises), FOE (foreign-owned
enterprises); ALL (all enterprises).

Figure 4.1 (a): Contracted FDI Inflows to China by Registration Type, 1992 – 1999 (in
100 million USD).
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press), various years.
Notes: “Others" include Foreign Investment Share Enterprises, Cooperative Development, and
Others.
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Figure 4.1 (b): Utilized FDI Inflows to China by Registration Type, 1997 – 2006 (in
100 million USD).
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook (Beijing: China Statistics Press), various years.
Notes: “Others" include Foreign Investment Share Enterprises, Cooperative Development, and
Others.

10,000

Figure 4.2: Sino-Foreign Joint Ventures by Initial Ownership and Transition State by
2006.
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Notes: Sino-foreign joint venture (SFJV); Wholly foreign-owned (WFOE); Wholly domestic-owned
(DOMESTIC).
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Table 2.1: Actually Utilized FDI from OECD Countries (%).

United States
Japan
Germany
United
Kingdom
France
Denmark
Switzerland
Canada
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Finland
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Korea
Luxembourg
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovak
Republic
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
Total OECD
Share in nonHMT Total

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
16.51% 22.30% 22.41% 17.68% 18.20% 13.46% 10.25% 7.73% 7.15%
14.40% 17.99% 17.38% 13.56% 11.41% 10.90% 14.18% 16.48% 11.48%
3.12% 7.26% 5.32% 4.84% 3.11% 2.75% 2.75% 3.86% 4.94%
4.97%

5.53%

5.95%

4.20%

3.01%

2.38%

2.06%

2.43%

1.81%

3.03%
0.27%
0.97%
1.34%
1.15%
0.09%
0.12%
0.02%
0.17%
0.00%
0.05%
0.00%
0.00%
1.16%
7.63%
0.05%
0.01%
3.04%
0.11%
0.11%
0.00%
0.04%

4.68%
0.45%
1.31%
1.66%
1.39%
0.12%
0.44%
0.07%
0.36%
0.00%
0.06%
0.00%
0.02%
0.99%
6.74%
0.02%
0.00%
2.87%
0.10%
0.10%
0.02%
0.04%

4.36%
0.25%
0.99%
1.43%
1.58%
0.12%
0.29%
0.05%
0.31%
0.07%
0.05%
0.00%
0.00%
1.07%
7.61%
0.12%
0.00%
4.04%
0.09%
0.12%
0.02%
0.02%

2.12%
0.22%
0.82%
1.76%
1.34%
0.23%
0.08%
0.02%
0.29%
0.03%
0.09%
0.00%
0.01%
0.88%
8.58%
0.11%
0.01%
3.10%
0.19%
0.02%
0.01%
0.10%

1.93%
0.24%
0.67%
1.97%
1.28%
0.23%
0.42%
0.05%
0.22%
0.02%
0.07%
0.00%
0.04%
0.59%
9.13%
0.05%
0.02%
1.92%
0.15%
0.10%
0.01%
0.03%

1.94% 1.71% 1.55%
0.14% 0.17% 0.25%
0.58% 0.53% 0.52%
1.81% 1.60% 1.15%
1.90% 1.72% 1.01%
0.30% 0.25% 0.19%
0.35% 0.21% 0.14%
0.04% 0.09% 0.01%
0.10% 0.07% 0.05%
0.01% 0.07% 0.00%
0.08% 0.13% 0.11%
0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
0.03% 0.01% 0.02%
1.01% 0.73% 0.81%
14.39% 16.25% 13.04%
0.56% 0.07% 0.36%
0.02% 0.06% 0.02%
2.33% 2.11% 2.63%
0.21% 0.30% 0.33%
0.06% 0.00% 0.07%
0.01% 0.01% 0.02%
0.01% 0.09% 0.01%

0.96%
0.48%
0.49%
1.06%
1.38%
0.37%
0.20%
0.05%
0.14%
0.00%
0.08%
0.01%
0.06%
0.87%
9.73%
0.24%
0.03%
2.10%
0.21%
0.03%
0.02%
0.02%

0.01%

0.00%

0.00%

0.05%

0.00%

0.04%

0.01%

0.00%

0.00%

0.23%
0.56%
0.00%

0.09%
0.82%
0.02%

0.17%
0.81%
0.01%

0.14%
0.34%
0.01%

0.31%
0.33%
0.01%

0.29%
0.39%
0.04%

0.39%
0.31%
0.02%

0.50%
0.28%
0.06%

0.59%
0.51%
0.03%

59.16% 75.47% 74.67% 60.84% 55.54% 56.11% 56.15% 53.65% 45.04%

Source: Author‟s calculations, China Statistical Yearbook (various years).
Note: The table reports the percentage share of actually utilized FDI in the non-HMT total.
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Table 2.2: Multinomial Logit Model of Foreign Acquisitions, All Industries.
TFP
Sales
Sales Squared
Capital per Worker
Wage per Worker
Age
Age2
Export Intensity
State Equity Share
Constant

OECD

HMT

0.007
(0.017)
-0.321***
(0.039)
0.028***
(0.002)
-0.018

-0.004
(0.017)
-.253***
(0.041)
0.023***
(0.002)
-0.035*

(0.018)
0.138***
(0.028)
0.169
(0.129)

(0.002)
0.061*
(0.034)
0.148
(0.115)

-0.204***
(0.039)
0.789***
(0.071)
1.123***
(0.075)
-6.310***
(0.257)

-0.182***
(0.037)
0.749***
(0.063)
1.097***
(0.067)
-6.224***
(0.246)

Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseudo-R2

942,771
-26,493.76
0.08
53,661.59
53,085.52

Schwarz criterion
Aikake criterion

Notes: The base category are all firms not acquired by HMT or OECD investors;
Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses; Significant at * 10% , ** 5%, *** 1%
levels; Export intensity measured as (value of exports/total sales); All regressions
include year, region, and two-digit industry dummies; All explanatory variables,
other than dummies or those expressed as shares, enter in the log form.
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Table 2.3: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity.
Log (TFP)
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition

Matching
Estimate†
0.123*

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.064

Z-Stat
1.922

Matched Pairs
1,493

One Year After

0.111*

0.062

1.780

1,493

**

0.083

2.947

1,493

Year ( )

Matching
Estimate†

Bootstrapped
Std. Error

Z-Stat

Matched Pairs

Year of Acquisition

0.177**

0.083

2.130

1,493

0.153

**

0.069

2.219

1,493

0.224

**

0.086

2.592

1,493

Two Years After

0.245

Log (Labor Productivity)

One Year After
Two Years After

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: † ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 2.4: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results, HMT-dense provinces.
Log (Profits)
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition

Matching
Estimate†
-0.056

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.254

Z-Stat
0.221

Matched Pairs
350

One Year After

0.253

0.261

0.969

350

0.320

2.316

350

Year ( )

Matching
Estimate†

Bootstrapped
Std. Error

Z-Stat

Matched Pairs

Year of Acquisition

-0.008

0.175

0.046

350

One Year After

0.061

0.135

0.452

350

Two Years After

0.142

0.190

0.747

350

Two Years After

0.741

**

Log (TFP)

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: † ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Total factor productivity (TFP) measured
using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method.
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Table 2.5: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, by Target
Ownership Type.
Private-owned firms
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition

Matching
Estimate†
0.129

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.128

Z-Stat
1.008

Matched Pairs
711

One Year After

0.132

0.106

1.245

711

Two Years After

0.199*

0.129

1.543

711

Year ( )

Matching
Estimate†

Bootstrapped
Std. Error

Z-Stat

Matched Pairs

Year of Acquisition

0.117

0.092

1.272

782

One Year After

0.093

0.093

1.000

782

*

0.102

2.814

782

State-owned firms

Two Years After

0.287

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Log total factor productivity (TFP)
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method.
†
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Table 2.6: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for non-TFP Outcomes.
(a) Log (Profits)
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition

Matching
Estimate†
0.266**

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.113

Z-Stat
2.354

Matched Pairs
1,493

One Year After

0.353**

0.125

2.817

1,493

***

0.136

3.833

1,493

Year of Acquisition

0.143***

0.039

3.717

1,493

One Year After

0.117***

0.041

2.818

1,493

Two Years After

0.128***

0.041

3.111

1,493

Year of Acquisition

0.018

0.039

0.479

1,493

One Year After

0.037

0.039

0.962

1,493

Two Years After

0.084*

0.048

1.763

1,493

0.215***

0.062

3.477

1,493

One Year After

0.259

***

0.068

3.782

1,493

Two Years After

0.214***

0.065

3.280

1,493

Year of Acquisition

0.005

0.011

0.436

1,493

One Year After

0.007

0.012

0.524

1,493

Two Years After

0.005

0.012

0.386

1,493

Year of Acquisition

0.008

0.008

0.994

720

One Year After

0.004

0.008

0.574

1,109

Two Years After

0.001

0.008

0.067

1,192

Two Years After

0.523

(b) Log (Average Wage)

(c) Log (Employment)

(d) Log (Capital per Worker)
Year of Acquisition

(e) Export Intensity

(f) Innovation Intensity

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: † ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Export intensity measured as (value of
exports/total sales); Innovation intensity measured as (new product output value/total sales).
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Table 2.7: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, By Industry
Grouping.
(a) High Domestic Content Industries
Matching
Estimate†
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition
0.186*
One Year After
Two Years After

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.089

Z-Stat
2.113

Matched Pairs
726

0.089

1.427

726

0.119

2.136

726

Bootstrapped
Std. Error
0.121

Z-Stat
0.515

Matched Pairs
767

0.127
0.254

**

(b) Low Domestic Content Industries
Matching
Year ( )
Estimate†
Year of Acquisition
0.063
One Year After

0.097

0.100

0.975

767

Two Years After

0.236*

0.142

1.657

767

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively. Log total factor productivity (TFP)
measured using Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method.
†
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Table 2.8: Matching Difference-in-Differences Results for Productivity, Textile
Industry Only.
Log (TFP)
Year ( )
Year of Acquisition

Matching
Estimate†
0.181*

Bootstrapped Std.
Error
0.099

Z-Stat
1.814

Matched Pairs
258

One Year After

0.137

0.129

1.062

258

Two Years After

0.150

0.103

0.103

258

Matching
Estimate†

Bootstrapped Std.
Error

Z-Stat

Matched Pairs

Year of Acquisition

0.197

*

0.121

1.630

258

One Year After

0.070

0.134

0.526

258

Two Years After

0.068

0.120

0.568

258

Log (Labor Productivity)
Year ( )

,(
) (
)-where is the pre-acquisition year;
Notes: † ∑
Bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis using 100 repetitions; *, **, ** indicate statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively; Total factor productivity (TFP) measured using
Levinsohn-Petrin (2003) method; Labor productivity measured as value added per worker; Textile
industry is composed of two-digit CIC industries 17 (Manufacture of Textile) and 18 (Manufacture
of Textile Wearing Apparel, Footwear, and Caps).

Table 3.1: Interactions Between Ownership Types.
Own-Industry Activity In:
State Owned
Private Owned
Foreign Owned

Enterprise Ownership Type
State Owned Private Owned Foreign Owned
+
?
?
+/+
?
+/+/+

118

Table 3.2: Distribution of Enterprises by Number of Plants (percentage), 1998-2006.
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006

Single-Plant Firms
96.69
95.58
97.09
95.35
94.97
96.76
95.60
97.00
97.40

Firms with 2 Plants
1.43
1.40
1.15
1.89
2.30
1.49
2.42
1.57
1.38

Firms with 3 or more Plants
1.88
3.02
1.76
2.76
2.73
1.75
1.98
1.43
1.22

Source: Author‟s calculations.
Notes: Enterprises with missing information on number of plants have been excluded.

Table 3.3: Percentage Share of Employment Represented by Single-Plant Enterprises
Within Each Ownership Type, 1998-2006.
Year
1998

SOE
79

POE
94

ECE
99

non-ECE
99

1999

75

94

98

98

2000

77

95

99

98

2001

64

89

97

95

2002

65

90

96

94

2003

76

95

98

98

2004

67

92

96

93

2005

72

94

97

96

2006

73

95

97

94

Source: Author‟s calculations.
Notes: Enterprises with missing information on number of plants have been excluded;
SOE (state-owned enterprises), POE (private-owned enterprises), ECE (enterprises
from Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan), non-ECE (enterprises from all other countries).
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Table 3.4: Differentials of Characteristics Between Enterprises Under Three
Ownership Types.
A. Comparing state-owned and private-owned enterprises
Outcome Variable
1998 1999 2000 2001
ln(Output)
0.67 0.66 0.59 0.53
ln(Exporting value)
0.24 0.19 0.13 0.09
ln(Value added per Worker)
1.02 0.96 0.96 0.86
ln(New product output value
0.70 0.70 0.73 0.77
per worker)
ln(Wage per worker)
0.21 0.14 0.19 0.11
ln(Capital per Worker)
-0.16 -0.24 -0.18 -0.27
B. Comparing state-owned and foreign-owned enterprises
Outcome Variable
1998 1999 2000 2001
ln(Output)
1.12 1.12 1.11 1.04
ln(Exporting value)
0.72 0.67 0.64 0.56
ln(Value added per Worker)
1.28 1.21 1.20 1.08
ln(New product output value 1.47 1.42 1.52 1.28
per worker)
ln(Wage per worker)
0.58 0.53 0.54 0.45
ln(Capital per Worker)
0.60 0.51 0.47 0.38

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
0.51 0.39 0.52 0.23 0.12
0.03 -0.03 -0.18 -0.30 -0.42
0.83 0.78 0.73 0.65 0.62
0.71 0.69
0.58 0.54
0.07 0.05 -0.02 -0.05 -0.05
-0.27 -0.27 -0.20 -0.22 -0.20
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1.02 0.92 1.09 0.80 0.72
0.58 0.45 0.39 0.25 0.14
1.03 0.93 0.83 0.75 0.70
1.17 1.15
0.72 0.73
0.40
0.32

C. Comparing private-owned and foreign-owned enterprises
Outcome Variable
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
ln(Output)
0.45 0.46 0.52 0.51 0.50
ln(Exporting value)
0.49 0.48 0.52 0.47 0.55
ln(Value added per Worker)
0.26 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.20
ln(New product output value 0.76 0.72 0.80 0.51 0.47
per worker)
ln(Wage per worker)
0.37 0.39 0.34 0.34 0.32
ln(Capital per Worker)
0.76 0.74 0.65 0.65 0.58

0.36
0.26

0.25
0.30

0.21
0.21

0.21
0.20

2003
0.53
0.48
0.15
0.47

2004
0.58
0.57
0.10
-

2005
0.57
0.55
0.09
0.15

2006
0.60
0.55
0.08
0.19

0.31
0.53

0.27
0.50

0.26
0.43

0.26
0.40

Notes: Tables A, B, and C report the coefficients of Ownership Type dummy in (3.4.1); All
coefficients are significant at the 1% level.
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Table 3.5: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED

PRIVATE OWNED

FOREIGN OWNED

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.013***
(0.003)

0.013***
(0.003)

-0.001
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)

0.000
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

(Private-owned)

0.029***
(0.003)

0.030***
(0.003)

0.020***
(0.001)

0.019***
(0.001)

0.005***
(0.002)

0.007***
(0.002)

(Foreign-owned)

0.000
(0.004)

0.002
(0.004)

0.001
(0.001)

0.002**
(0.001)

0.014***
(0.002)

0.014***
(0.002)

0.722***
(0.018)
0.296***
(0.015)

0.708***
(0.018)
0.306***
(0.015)

0.512***
(0.006)
0.249***
(0.003)

0.520***
(0.006)
0.244***
(0.003)

0.548***
(0.007)
0.316***
(0.008)

0.559***
(0.007)
0.311***
(0.008)

Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

City*Year Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

4-Digit Industry Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.71

0.71

0.48

0.49

0.51

0.54

58,879

58,879

1,092,188

1,092,188

334,888

334,888

Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)

Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital

2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5%
level; *Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.6: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers Differentiating Between
Private and Collective Owned Enterprises.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED
(1)

(2)

0.014***
(0.003)

0.012***
(0.003)

0.029***
(0.004)

0.027***
(0.004)

-

0.012***
(0.003)

0.002
(0.004)

0.000
(0.003)

Labor

0.711***
(0.020)

0.709***
(0.018)

Capital

0.305***
(0.015)

0.305***
(0.015)

City*Year Dummies

Y

Y

4-Digit Industry Dummies

Y

Y

0.71

0.71

58,879

58,879

Log Own Industry
Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Collective-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Log Production Inputs

2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level;
***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16
“Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.7: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added.
STATE OWNED
Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Ethnically Chinese-owned)
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned)

PRIVATE OWNED

ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

NON-ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.014***
(0.003)
0.029***
(0.003)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.007*
(0.004)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.030***
(0.003)
0.006
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)

-0.001
(0.001)
0.020***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.001)
0.019***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)
0.002*
(0.001)

-0.001
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.002)
0.004**
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)

0.721***
(0.018)
0.296***
(0.015)

0.708***
(0.018)
0.306***
(0.015)

0.512***
(0.006)
0.249***
(0.003)

0.520***
(0.006)
0.244***
(0.003)

0.562***
(0.007)
0.289***
(0.007)

0.579***
(0.007)
0.282***
(0.007)

0.542***
(0.008)
0.327***
(0.009)

0.546***
(0.009)
0.326***
(0.009)

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

-

Y
Y

-

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

Y

Y
Y

0.71

0.71

0.48

0.49

0.48

0.50

0.53

0.54

58,879

58,879

1,092,188

1,092,188

178,933

178,933

155,955

155,955

Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry
Dummies
City*Year Dummies
4-Digit Industry Dummies
2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the
10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.

123

Table 3.8: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers (single-plant firms only).
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

PRIVATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

FOREIGN OWNED
(1)
(2)

Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)

0.014***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.004)
-0.002
(0.004)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.018***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)

0.003*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)

0.004***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)

0.729***
(0.019)
0.280***
(0.016)

0.716***
(0.019)
0.290***
(0.016)

0.475***
(0.006)
0.236***
(0.003)

0.483***
(0.006)
0.231***
(0.003)

0.547***
(0.007)
0.312***
(0.007)

0.559***
(0.007)
0.307***
(0.008)

Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

City*Year Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

4-Digit Industry Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.68

0.68

0.42

0.44

0.50

0.51

45,744

45,744

769,860

769,860

300,736

300,736

(Private-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital

Adjusted R

2

# Enterprises

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5%
level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.9: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment (single-plant firms only).
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED
Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Ethnically Chinese-owned)
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned)
Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry
Dummies
City*Year Dummies
4-Digit Industry Dummies
2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

PRIVATE OWNED

ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

NON-ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.014***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.032***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)

0.000
(0.001)
0.019***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)

0.004*
(0.002)
0.004*
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)

0.005***
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)

-0.009**
(0.004)

-0.006
(0.004)

0.001
(0.001)

0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)

0.015***
(0.002)

0.015***
(0.002)

0.729***
(0.019)
0.280***
(0.016)
Y

0.715***
(0.019)
0.290***
(0.016)
-

0.475***
(0.006)
0.236***
(0.003)
Y

0.483***
(0.006)
0.231***
(0.003)
-

0.561**
(0.007)
0.289***
(0.007)
Y

0.578***
(0.008)
0.282***
(0.007)
-

0.539***
(0.008)
0.323***
(0.009)
Y

0.544***
(0.009)
0.321***
(0.009)
-

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.68

0.68

0.42

0.44

0.48

0.50

0.52

0.54

45,744

45,744

769,860

769,860

163,744

163,744

136,992

136,992

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the
10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.10: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers (single-plant and multi-plant firms only)a .
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

PRIVATE OWNED
(1)
(2)

FOREIGN OWNED
(1)
(2)

Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.004)
-0.004
(0.004)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.004)
-0.003
(0.004)

0.000
(0.001)
0.019***
(0.001)
0.000
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)

0.003*
(0.001)
0.001
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)

0.004***
(0.001)
0.005***
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)

0.730***
(0.019)
0.280***
(0.016)

0.716***
(0.019)
0.289***
(0.016)

0.475***
(0.006)
0.236***
(0.003)

0.483***
(0.006)
0.231***
(0.003)

0.547***
(0.007)
0.312***
(0.007)

0.559***
(0.007)
0.307***
(0.008)

Year, City, 4-Digit Industry Dummies

Y

-

Y

-

Y

-

City*Year Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

4-Digit Industry Dummies

-

Y

-

Y

-

Y

0.68

0.68

0.42

0.44

0.50

0.51

45,744

45,744

769,860

769,860

300,736

300,736

(Private-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Log Production Inputs
Log Labor
Log Capital

2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

Notes: aTable displays Own Industry Employment in single-plant firms only. Coefficients of own industry employment in multi-plant
firms are not reported in the interest of space. Observations include single-plant firms only; Standard errors in parentheses are robust and
clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16
“Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.11: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers, by Source of Foreign Investment (single-plant and multi-plant firms
only).
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED

Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Ethnically Chinese-owned)
(Non-ethnically Chinese-owned)

PRIVATE OWNED

ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

NON-ETHNICALLY
CHINESE OWNED
(1)
(2)

(1)

(2)

(1)

(2)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.004)
0.003
(0.005)
-0.009**
(0.004)

0.013***
(0.004)
0.031***
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
-0.007*
(0.004)

0.000
(0.001)
0.019***
(0.001)
-0.001
(0.001)
0.001
(0.001)

-0.000
(0.001)
0.017***
(0.001)
-0.000
(0.001)
0.002
(0.001)

0.001
(0.002)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.014***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.002)

0.002
(0.002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.013***
(0.002)
0.001
(0.001)

0.004**
(0.002)
0.004**
(002)
0.003
(0.002)
0.015***
(0.002)

0.005***
(0.002)
0.006***
(0.002)
0.002
(0.002)
0.015***
(.002)

0.730***
(0.019)
0.280***
(0.016)
Y

0.716***
(0.019)
0.289***
(0.016)
-

0.475***
(0.006)
0.236***
(0.003)
Y

0.483***
(0.006)
0.231***
(0.003)
-

0.561**
(0.007)
0.289***
(0.007)
Y

0.578***
(0.008)
0.282***
(0.007)
-

0.539***
(0.008)
0.323***
(0.009)
Y

0.544***
(0.009)
0.321***
(0.009)
-

-

Y
Y

-

Y
Y

-

Y
Y

-

Y
Y

0.68

0.68

0.48

0.44

0.48

0.50

0.52

0.51

45,744

45,744

769,860

769,860

163,744

163,744

136,992

136,992

Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital
Year, City, 4-Digit Industry
Dummies
City*Year Dummies
4-Digit Industry Dummies
2

Adjusted R
# Enterprises

Notes: aTable displays Own Industry Employment in single-plant firms only. Coefficients of own industry employment in multi-plant firms are not reported in the
interest of space. Observations include single-plant firms only; Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the
1% level; **Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 3.12: Own and Cross Type Localization Spillovers Controlling for Output Market Competition.
Dependent Variable: Log of Enterprise Value Added
STATE OWNED PRIVATE OWNED FOREIGN OWNED
Log Own Industry Employment
(State-owned)
(Private-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Log Number of Own Industry
Enterprises
(Private-owned)
(Foreign-owned)
Log Production Inputs
Labor
Capital
City*Year Dummies
4-Digit Industry Dummies
Adjusted R

2

# Enterprises

0.012***
(0.003)
0.024***
(0.004)
0.000
(0.004)

-0.005***
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.002)
0.000
(0.002)

0.001
(0.001)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.007***
(0.002)

0.030***
(0.020)
-0.003
(0.025)

0.040***
(0.005)
-0.008
(0.006)

0.038***
(0.006)
0.017**
(0.006)

0.708***
(0.018)
0.305***
(0.015)
Y

0.516***
(0.006)
0.248***
(0.003)
Y

0.550***
(0.007)
0.315***
(0.0078)
Y

Y

Y

Y

0.71

0.42

0.52

58,879

1,092,188

334,888

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses are robust and clustered at the 4-Digit Industry level; ***Significant at the 1% level;
**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level; Industry 16 “Tobacco Products Processing” has been excluded.
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Table 4.1: Optimal Effort Levels.
Ownership of Enterprise
,
,
Foreign firm owns
Chinese firm owns

Control of Production
= 0,
Foreign firm controls
production

Wholly Foreign Owned

Not Observed

⁄

⁄

(

)⁄

(
= 1,
Chinese firm controls
production

)

(
⁄

⁄

Sino-Foreign Joint Venture
(

(

)

((

)(

(

)

129

)⁄

Domestic Firm

) ⁄
))⁄
⁄

⁄
(

(
⁄

)

)⁄

Table 4.2: Data Definitions and Summary Statistics.
Variable

Definition

Firm Level
Distance to Domestic Technology
Frontier

Difference between own and maximum log TFP of domestic
Chinese firms within four digit CIC

3.523

2.111

Log Value Added

Log of real value added, in 1000 Yuan

8.486

2.109

Domestic Sales Share

Share of total sales directed to the domestic Chinese market

0.642

0.427

Affiliation Dummy

Takes the value 1 if joint venture affiliated with central
government or provincial government, 0 otherwise

0.112

0.315

Log Employment

Log of total employment

5.024

1.024

4-digit Industry Level
Increase in State Share of Industry
Sales

Increase in SOE share of industry sales, at the four digit CIC
between1998 and 2000

-0.048

0.060

Total number of firms in 4- digit CIC and city as a share of
total number of firms in city x 100

0.007

0.012

Manager‟s Outside Option

Mean

St. Dev.

Notes: All variables are measured as of 2000 unless otherwise noted; CIC is the Chinese Industrial Classification; SOE is stateowned enterprise.
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Table 4.3: Multinomial Logit Model of Changes in Organizational Form.
(1)

(2)

(3)

WFOE

DOM

WFOE

DOM

WFOE

DOM

0.072***
(0.023)
0.105***
(0.026)
-0.509***
(0.064)
0.027
(0.034)

-0.054*
(0.029)
-0.054
(0.033)
0.285***
(0.045)
0.285***
(0.045)

0.075***
(0.026)
0.101***
(0.029)
-0.517***
(0.070)
0.035
(0.036)

-0.111***
(0.035)
-0.111***
(0.037)
0.950***
(0.107)
0.347***
(0.049)

0.056**
(0.027)
0.083***
(0.029)
-0.383***
(0.072)
0.055
(0.037)

-0.097***
(0.035)
-0.105***
(0.038)
0.867***
(0.112)
0.301***
(0.050)

Firm-level variables
Distance to Domestic
Technology Frontier
Log Value Added
Domestic Sales Share
Log Employment
Two Digit Industry Dummies?
Province Dummies?
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseduo-R2
Schwarz criterion
Aikake criterion

N
N
12,339
-7,709.26
0.016
15,512.73
15,438.53

Y
N
12,339
-7,648.21
0.023
15,899.33
15,424.42

Y
Y
12,339
-7,435.68
0.05
16,039.50
15,119.36

Notes: Estimations based on sample of all Sino-foreign joint ventures established between 1992 and 2000 in the 2000 Annual
Survey of Industrial Production; Sino-foreign joint venture is the base category; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; ***
significant at 1%; Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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Table 4.4: Elasticities and Standard Errors.

Distance to Domestic
Technology Frontier
Log Value Added
Domestic Sales Share
Log Employment

WFOE
0.232***
(0.069)
0.798***
(0.189)
-0.323***
(0.36)
0.030
(0.146)

(1)
DOMESTIC
-0.214**
(0.098)
-0.550**
(0.261)
0.648***
(0.063)
1.325***
(0.210)

Notes: Elasticity calculations based on MNL models given in Table 3.
errors in parentheses.

WFOE
0.253***
(0.079)
0.807***
(0.211)
-0.324***
(0.039)
0.047
(0.156)
*

(2)
DOMESTIC
-0.401***
(0.114)
-1.004***
(0.299)
0.617***
(0.065)
1.615***
(0.230)

WFOE
0.193**
(0.082)
0.674***
(0.217)
-0.249***
(0.040)
0.159
(0.163)

(3)
DOMESTIC
-0.347***
(0.116)
-0.929***
(0.305)
0.555***
(0.068)
1.392***
(0.235)

significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%; Standard
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Table 4.5: Multinomial Logit Tests of the Property Rights Theory.
(1)
Firm-level variables
Distance to Domestic Technology
Frontier
Distance to Domestic Technology
Frontier * Affiliation Dummy
Log Value Added
Log Value Added * Manager‟s Outside
Option
Domestic Sales Share
Domestic Sales Share * Change in State
Share of Industry Sales
Log Employment
Two Digit Industry Dummies?
Province Dummies?
Number of Observations
Log Likelihood
Pseduo-R2
Schwarz criterion
Aikake criterion

(2)

(3)

WFOE

DOM

WFOE

DOM

WFOE

DOM

0.082***
(0.023)
-0.092***
(0.027)
0.106***
(0.026)
-0.874***
(0.275)
-0.512***
(0.073)

-0.041
(0.030)
-0.117***
(0.037)
-0.055*
(0.034)
-0.068
(0.359)
0.953***
(0.110)

0.092***
(0.026)
-0.102***
(0.027)
0.111***
(0.029)
-0.999***
(0.329)
-0.493***
(0.076)

-0.093***
(0.035)
-0.111***
(0.037)
-0.109***
(0.038)
0.311
(0.357)
0.925***
(0.113)

0.072***
(0.027)
-0.127***
(0.032)
0.094***
(0.030)
-0.959***
(0.327)
-0.379***
(0.078)

-0.090**
(0.035)
-0.061
(0.037)
-0.108***
(0.038)
0.658*
(0.359)
0.847***
(0.118)

0.111
(0.611)
0.040
(0.035)

-1.302**
(0.562)
0.296***
(0.046)

0.0.329
(0.626)
0.040
(0.036)

-0.915
(0.658)
0.348***
(0.049)

0.189
(0.640)
0.064*
(0.037)

-0.641
(0.667)
0.303***
(0.050)

N
N
12,334
-7,686.19
0.018
15,523.1
15,404.38

Y
N
12,334
-7,625.25
0.030
15,909.90
15,390.49

Y
Y
12,334
-7,414.64
0.053
16,053.90
15,089.29

Notes: Estimations based on sample of all Sino-foreign joint ventures established between 1992 and 2000 in the 2000 Annual Survey
of Industrial Production; Sino-foreign joint venture is the base category; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%; Standard errors in parentheses are corrected for heteroskedasticity.
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